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Minimum Contacts in a Borderless
World: Voice over Internet Protocol
and the Coming Implosion of Personal
Jurisdiction Theory
Danielle Keats Citron∗
Modern personal jurisdiction theory rests on the twin pillars of state
sovereignty and due process. A nonresident’s “minimum contacts” with a
forum state are treated as the equivalent of her territorial presence in the state
and hence justify a state’s exercise of sovereignty over her. At the same time, the
nonresident’s “purposeful availment” of opportunities within the state is seen as
implying her agreement to that state’s jurisdiction in exchange for the
protection of its laws. This theory presumes that a nonresident directs voice
communications to known places by dialing a telephone number’s area code.
Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) and the borderless communications of
the twenty-first century belie this assumption. Area codes will no longer
reliably correspond to known locations; individuals can call, and do mischief in,
a state without ever realizing that they are contacting that state. With VoIP
and its emerging applications, most means of interstate communications —
voice, fax, file-sharing, e-mail, and real-time video conferencing — will lack
geographic markers.
The U.S. Supreme Court will be forced to choose which value is paramount:
state sovereignty or the implied contract approach to due process. In a few cases
arising from cellular phone calls, lower courts have privileged the implied
contract theory. This effectively returns the law of personal jurisdiction to the
nineteenth century formalism of Pennoyer v. Neff by limiting jurisdiction to
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defendants’ home states in cases arising from harmful communications. This
evisceration of state sovereignty is unwarranted. Other means can protect a
nonresident defendant from abusive process. Securing state sovereignty over
harmful borderless communications promotes a healthy federalism, reconciling
seemingly inconsistent centrifugal and centripetal themes in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the “minimum contacts” doctrine, a state’s ability to subject
nonresidents to its courts’ jurisdiction rests on the state’s sovereignty
1
over the nonresidents’ litigation-related activities within its territory.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, limits
a state’s adjudicative authority to nonresidents whose purposeful
affiliation with the state suggests their implicit agreement to the state’s
2
exercise of jurisdiction over them. In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court
has crafted its sovereignty and due process doctrines to complement one
another: it deems valid the exercise of state sovereignty consonant with
due process and defines any attempt to exceed the bounds of state
sovereignty as offensive to due process.
Much of this is accomplished through the device of implied contract.
In the traditional, circuit-switched telephone system, a New Yorker
3
dialing a phone number with a San Francisco area code indicates her
intent to connect with California and her implied agreement to subject
4
herself to California’s courts. For more than half a century, the law of
personal jurisdiction harmoniously rested on the twin pillars of
1
See infra notes 90-170 and accompanying text (exploring territorial contact
requirement of minimum contacts doctrine and its state sovereignty justification).
2
See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (describing purposeful availment
requirement of minimum contacts doctrine and its implied contract rationale).
3
See ALLIANCE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS, NPA ALLOCATION
PLAN AND ASSIGNMENT GUIDELINES 5 (2002), https://www.atis.org/atis/docstore/
doc_display.asp?ID=312 (explaining that first three digits of phone numbers in ten-digit
North American Numbering Plan traditionally correspond to “distinct exclusive
geographic areas, commonly referred to as area codes”).
4
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (finding that
nonresidents purposefully direct activities to state and thus warrant state’s personal
jurisdiction over them “by mail[ing] and wir[ing] communications across state lines”).
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5

territorial contact and implied contract.
A new and rapidly expanding technology, Voice over Internet
Protocol (“VoIP”), tears those two pillars apart. In a trend presaged by
6
cellular phone technology, VoIP and the impending Services over the
7
Internet Protocol (“SoIP”) will transmit all remote communications —
voice, fax, e-mail, file-sharing, and real-time video conferencing — to
8
Internet telephony subscribers at any broadband-accessible location.
Whereas AT&T created a tightly controlled telephone system in which
phone calls follow dedicated circuits, Internet telephony providers

5

This Article focuses exclusively on VoIP’s impact on questions of specific
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts doctrine. Under current theory, the exercise of
specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants hinges on two critical factors: the
nonresidents’ purposeful connection with the forum state that suggests their enjoyment of
the forum’s laws and implicit agreement to face litigation there and the nonresidents’
litigation-raising activity in the forum. See, e.g., id. at 473 n.15, 476. The minimum contacts
doctrine also sanctions “general jurisdiction” over a nonresident. This theory permits a
forum’s courts to hear any cause of action against a nonresident defendant, no matter
where the cause of action arises, because the defendant is considered a local player in the
state either due to her residence there or, as to a corporation, due to its incorporation in the
state or maintenance of its principal place of business there. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320
(9th Cir. 1998). Because general jurisdiction theory is not predicated on principles of
implied contract and litigation-related territorial contact, this Article only addresses
specific jurisdiction and the impending schism in its theoretical underpinnings that VoIPcontact cases will provoke.
6
Cellular phones and call forwarding have served as precursors to VoIP by
disconnecting voice communications from presumed, fixed locations. Although a cellular
phone’s area code signals its owner’s location at the time of the phone’s purchase, cellular
phones are mobile. Thus, calls to cellular phones may be answered in geographic locations
that differ from the location suggested by their phone numbers’ area codes. VoIP blazes a
new trail in disconnecting all of our communications (i.e., voice, fax, e-mail, file-sharing,
and real-time video conferencing) from specific locations by eliminating the geographic
significance of area codes and by destroying the notion that remote communications will be
received in predictable locations. While this Article addresses the implications of cellular
phone contacts for the personal jurisdiction doctrine, those contacts alone might not prove
fatal to the current regime. This Article focuses on VoIP and its future applications because
their complete lack of territoriality inevitably leads to a schism between the territorial
contact and implied contract principles in the modern minimum contacts doctrine.
7
See infra notes 63-72 (describing future applications of VoIP known as SoIP).
8
See First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In re IP-Enabled
Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, FCC 05-116, at 33
(F.C.C.R. June 3, 2005) [hereinafter FCC Order], available at http://www.fcc.gov/
cgb/voip911order.pdf (highlighting “lack of geographic restrictions” as central customer
benefit of VoIP). VoIP and wireless technologies facilitate multiple forms of collaboration
in real time, without regard to geography, distance, or in the near future, even language.
See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 165-70 (2005); Simon Tuck, Jobs at Risk if CRTC Regulates VoIP, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Sept. 22, 2004, at B7 (“[G]eography and borders are irrelevant when it comes to
[VoIP] services.”).
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designed VoIP to overcome the limitations of geography, “not to track
9
it.”
VoIP telephone numbers are not physically linked to fixed locations,
like a customer’s kitchen or office, as they would be in the traditional
10
telephone system. Instead, VoIP numbers attach to people, wherever
11
they may be. Thus, VoIP subscribers can select area codes for their
VoIP numbers that have no connection to the actual location of their
residence or office and can program their VoIP service to route their calls
12
to numbers in different states simultaneously.
As noted by the
cofounder of the Internet Telephony Service Providers Association,
Internet telephony creates an atmosphere of “the Wild West,” where
13
“monitor[ing] borders” is impossible. In a VoIP-connected world,
individuals can no longer direct their communications to identifiable
14
places.
Consider this example. A Pennsylvania company uses VoIP phone
numbers with New York and New Jersey area codes in the hopes of
attracting business there. On the president’s desk in Philadelphia rings a

9
Cheryl A. Tritt, Telecommunications Future, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 245, 253 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 3202, 2004) (distinguishing
traditional, circuit-switched telephony, which establishes “dedicated circuit between the
parties,” from VoIP technology, which instead converts voice and fax communications into
data packets and sends data all over Internet to be regathered and ordered for recipient’s
telephone or computer).
10
Compare LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 31 (2001) (discussing traditional telephone system that connected
individuals in fixed locations), and WILLIAM MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND
THE INFOBAHN 9 (1995) (asserting that telephone calls and fax transmissions “link specific
machines at identifiable locations,” such as “telephone on your desk and telephone on my
desk”), with infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text (exploring geography-defying nature
of VoIP).
11
See infra notes 27-62 and accompanying text (describing VoIP technology).
12
See Ian Urbina, Area Codes, Now Divorced from Their Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at
B1 (explaining that Internet telephony has torn area codes from geography, allowing
people to have phone numbers with area codes that bear no connection to where
subscribers live or work); see also infra notes 38-46 (describing VoIP area codes). As Ian
Urbina notes: “It used to be safe to assume that dialing 212 made a phone ring in
Manhattan. Press 212 these days, and someone may answer in Tokyo.” Urbina, supra.
13
Helen Beckett, Small Firms Go First, COMPUTER WKLY., May 3, 2005, at 48. As the
CEO of Vonage has explained, VoIP aims to decouple communications from localities.
Martin Sims, The Market Will Provide, INTERMEDIA, Feb. 1, 2005, at 6.
14
See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 4 (explaining that Internet-based instruments sever
human interaction from fixed locations); Urbina, supra note 12, at B1 (noting that, in
contrast to traditional telephone conversations where “[c]allers used to know where they
were calling but not necessarily who would pick up,” “the reverse is now true,” as area
codes assigned to cellular and VoIP phones move with user).
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phone call to the company’s New York phone number from a Michigan
resident. If their conversation gives rise to tort and contract claims,
where can the company sue the Michigander? The Michigander
believed that he contacted a New Yorker based on the telephone number
that he dialed, when, in fact, his activities were directed toward
Pennsylvania. Although the Michigander’s phone call may have caused
harm in Pennsylvania, the Michigander had no warning of his
involvement with Pennsylvania and did not seek out the benefits and
protections of its laws.
Thus, if “purposeful connection” and its implied contract rationale
remain a prerequisite for jurisdiction, the Michigander cannot be sued in
Pennsylvania for the harm he allegedly did there. The Michigander
thought he was contacting New York, yet no New York people, places,
or equipment were involved. This leaves New York with no justification
for exercising sovereignty over these events and may force the
Pennsylvania firm to go to Michigan to sue. The long arm of the law just
got a great deal shorter.
This Article demonstrates how the geography-defying nature of VoIP
puts the previously harmonious principles underlying the minimum
contacts doctrine, territorial contact and implied contract, into
irreconcilable conflict. This clash will force the Supreme Court to
reconstruct its theory of personal jurisdiction for VoIP-related contacts
from the ground up. In the fifteen years since the Court last considered
personal jurisdiction, communication technologies have changed
radically. Neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have responded to
these changes.
This Article seeks to fill that void. If an individual can have contacts
with a state while not purposefully availing herself of opportunities in
that state, which principle controls? Is the law of personal jurisdiction
fundamentally about a state’s sovereignty over a nonresident’s territorial
acts within that state’s borders? Or does it derive its core justification
from implied contract? One answer allows an individual to be tricked
into litigating in a forum she had hoped to avoid; the other deprives a
state of the ability to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident whose
litigation-related activity caused harm within that state’s territory.
Part I describes how VoIP creates a borderless world of
communications that differs from the controlled architecture of the
traditional telephone system. It looks at VoIP’s underlying technology,
its defining features, and its geography-defying nature. It concludes by
describing SoIP, which will expand the nature and ease of VoIP
communications, likely enhancing VoIP’s popularity and ultimately
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destroying the notion of location-specific communications.
Part II dissects the concepts that have traditionally provided
normative support for the minimum contacts doctrine — a nonresident’s
territorial contact and implied contract. It explores how, when the Court
designed the minimum contacts doctrine, individuals at a distance
contacted each other from known locations, through the mail or the
telephone. This ensured that a defendant would establish her in-forum
presence in the same state she impliedly agreed to contact. In cases
arising from mobile communications, the concepts of territorial contact
and implied contract directly conflict due to a nonresident caller’s
inability to identify, and thus to consent to have contact with, the
particular state where the cellular phone user received the nonresident’s
call. This conflict has driven some state courts to the extreme step of
declaring all calls to cellular phone users jurisdictionally insignificant, no
matter the harm those calls inflict.
Part III demonstrates how VoIP communications will ripen this clash
of principles and offers a possible solution to that conflict. It contends
that, because VoIP area codes are not designed to reflect subscribers’
geographic locations, the twin principles of territorial contact and
implied contract inevitably will clash. If the personal jurisdiction
doctrine fundamentally concerns an implied private agreement between
a nonresident and the forum, the state will be stripped of its adjudicatory
authority over a nonresident’s calls to VoIP subscribers within its
borders. In effect, personal jurisdiction law will revert to the formalism
15
of Pennoyer v. Neff that the Court rejected six decades ago. On the other
hand, if the minimum contacts theory primarily serves to guarantee a
state’s sovereign authority over activities within its territory, a
nonresident may be sued in a forum she had no reason to know she had
contacted.
Part III urges that the implied contract rationale of the purposefulness
inquiry cannot and should not be sustained in a VoIP-connected world.
The alternative would be for the law of personal jurisdiction to abandon
efforts to fairly allocate state adjudicative authority over interstate
activities causing harm within a state’s borders in favor of the
elimination of that authority in cases arising from VoIP communications.
This part contends that a nonresident’s due process rights can be secured
without sacrificing a state’s judicial authority. This can be accomplished
by assessing the state’s regulatory interest in the nonresident’s litigationrelated forum activity to ensure the reasonableness of the state’s exercise

15

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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of judicial jurisdiction over the nonresident. Part III concludes by
arguing that such a reconstituted minimum contacts doctrine would
protect a nonresident defendant’s due process rights while honoring a
state’s sovereignty over that defendant’s communications transmitted to
its territory.
I.

VOIP: COMMUNICATIONS IN A BORDERLESS WORLD

The Supreme Court developed its current personal jurisdiction
doctrine at a time when communications over the traditional, circuitswitched telephone system connected individuals in fixed and
identifiable geographic locations. This part describes that system and
how, in the fifteen years since the Supreme Court last ruled on personal
jurisdiction, communication technologies have undergone revolutionary
change with the adoption of cellular phones and the emergence of VoIP
technology. If individuals and businesses increasingly trade in their
traditional telephones to enjoy the low cost, efficiency, and future
applications of VoIP as analysts predict, all of the ways in which we
establish a virtual presence in far-flung places — voice, fax, e-mail, filesharing, and real-time video — will lack geographic markers. With
VoIP, only people matter.
A.

The Traditional Telephone System

Although Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876,
AT&T did not succeed in building a long-distance telephone network
16
that reached half of American households until the 1950s.
In the
traditional system that AT&T established, Plain Old Telephone Service
(“POTS”), telephones transmit voices over underground or aboveground
17
wiring and cables to the Public Switched Telephone Network (“PSTN”).
PSTN employs a circuit-switching technology that connects the calling

16
See ANITA LOUISE MCCORMICK, THE INVENTION OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE
TELEPHONE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79-88 (2004) (describing Alexander Graham Bell’s 1876
invention of telephone and development of telephone system by companies Bell founded).
By the 1960s, the telephone system linked 85% of American homes. LESSIG, supra note 10,
at 29.
17
STEPHEN J. BIGELOW ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS 4-8 (4th ed.
2001). The PSTN began as a human-operated, analog switching system with operators
connecting calls using cords attached to a switchboard. See NATHAN J. MULLER, DESKTOP
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 737 (2d ed. 2000). Over the years, the system
turned to electromechanical switching, eliminating the need for operators to connect every
call. Id. Today, the switching system is completely electronic and digital. Id.
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18

phone to the called phone. Connections between callers are maintained
19
over copper wires or fiber-optic cables. This system persists today,
little changed from when AT&T designed it in the first part of the last
century. On the traditional telephone network, it is usually possible to
determine the “jurisdiction of the traffic on a call-by-call basis” because
the carrier provides a “physical connection to the end user and can
20
determine where the user is located.”
In the PSTN, area codes indicate a telephone or fax user’s specific
21
geographic location. In the 1990s, the North American Numbering Plan

18

MULLER, supra note 17, at 736.
See Konrad L. Trope, Voiceover Internet Protocol: The Revolution in America’s
Telecommunications Restructuring Infrastructure, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW 55, 59-60, 72 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 5994, 2005) (noting that analog telephone calls “require voice
signals from each conversation to flow on a single circuit”).
20
Petition for Vonage Holdings Corp. for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of
the Minn. Public Utilities Comm’n, No. P6214/C-03-108, at 28 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=651518
2877. In the PSTN, every phone call is switched through a series of telephone company
central offices until a dedicated path connects the calling and called parties. See Jeff Smith,
Qwest Rolls Out Internet Phone Service, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), May 10, 2005, at 1B.
This path, or circuit, “stays in place for the duration of the conversation.” MULLER, supra
note 17, at 736. Although the telephone network has been digitized in certain regions, the
fiber optic cables that have replaced the copper wires in the analog system connect callers
and recipients with the same circuit-switching technology. JOSEPH A. PECAR & DAVID A.
GARBIN, THE NEW MCGRAW-HILL TELECOM FACTBOOK 187 (2d ed. 2000). Describing the
traditional, circuit-switched telephone system, Professor Lessig noted that “when you
called someone in Paris, a circuit was opened between you and Paris . . . . You could trace
the line of copper that linked you to Paris; along that line of copper, all your conversation
would travel.” LESSIG, supra note 10, at 31; see also Tom Farley, Digital Wireless Basics,
http://www.privateline.com/PCS/history11.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (analogizing
PSTN system to railroad, noting that “[i]t’s like having a dedicated railroad track with only
one train, your call, permitted on the track at a time”).
21
See Wikipedia, North American Numbering Plan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
North_American_Numbering_Plan (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). AT&T designed the North
American Numbering Plan (“NANP”) in 1947 to facilitate direct dialing between
individuals in different regions in the country without the assistance of an operator. Id.
Particular geographic regions were assigned new or additional area codes to ensure that
populated regions of the country had ample available telephone numbers to distribute to
telephone subscribers. Id. The NANP originally assigned 86 area codes; each area code
corresponded to a specific geographic region in the country. Id. The most populated areas
received area code numbers that took the shortest time to dial on rotary phones (e.g., New
York City was assigned 212, a total of 5 clicks on the rotary phone, whereas Vermont
received 802, which amounted to 20 clicks). Id.; see Urbina, supra note 12 (describing that
when area codes were invented, all 86 original area codes covered “single continuous
regions” with 914 as only exception since it “encompassed two parts of downstate New
York separated by Queens and the Bronx: Westchester County and the area now served by
845, and Nassau and Suffolk Counties”).
Interestingly, the local Bell telephone companies initially used the names of
19
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Administrator assigned new area codes to densely populated geographic
regions to accommodate the increasing demand for available phone
22
numbers.
All of the new area codes corresponded to geographic
23
locations, except for toll-free area codes and fee-for-service codes.
Cellular phone companies also assign geographic area codes to their
phones based on their subscribers’ residence or office on the date they
24
purchased their mobile phones.

telephone subscribers, not numbers, to guide the switchboards. See JOHN BROOKS,
TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 74 (1976). The companies only replaced the names
with numbers in 1879 to prevent mistakes by substitute telephone operators who were not
familiar with the names of the callers and the jacks assigned to them on the switchboard.
Id. (explaining that, in 1879, local epidemic struck town of Lowell, Massachusetts,
prompting town physician to urge local Bell company management to change telephone
subscribers’ designation from their names to numbers so that if town’s four telephone
operators fell ill, switchboard service would not be paralyzed due to substitute operators
who did not know names that corresponded with each of 200 jacks). The local Bell
company management initially objected to switching the identification of its subscribers
from names to numbers because it believed that “customers would consider their
designation by numbers to be beneath their dignity.” Id.
22
See Wikipedia, supra note 21. From 1984 to 1994, only nine new area codes were
added to the NANP. See Urbina, supra note 12, at B1. Today, many U.S. cities have more
than one area code, either by splitting the city into different areas or by providing more
than one code for the same geographical area. Id. For example, the NANP initially
assigned 212 as the area code for telephone subscribers in New York City, but added two
more area codes, 917 and 646, to accommodate consumer demand. Id.
23
See Wikipedia, supra note 21. Toll-free numbers like 800, 877, and 866 “are not
issued to actual areas.” Id.
24
The NANP system does not maintain “separate, non-geographic area codes” for
cellular phones as do most European countries. Id. Because cellular phones receive the
same “locality-specific codes as landlines,” cellular phone users are billed at the same rate
as traditional telephones. Id. But unlike traditional telephones, cellular phones are mobile,
wireless devices that operate as sophisticated radios, transmitting signals via a network of
transmitters and antennae over limited geographic areas or “cells.” Lana Mobydeen, Reach
Out and Touch Someone: Cellular Phones Health, Safety and Reasonable Regulation, 16 J.L. &
HEALTH 373, 375 (2001). Calls made over cellular phones are transmitted to a mobile
telephone switching office, which then connects calls to local telephone companies that
route them to a long distance carrier or the ultimate recipient. Id. at 375-76. As cellular
customers move from one geographic location to another, the call is passed from “cell” to
“cell” without service interruption. ROBERT A. STEUERNAGEL, THE CELLULAR CONNECTION
10-12 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, individuals calling cellular phones have no assurance about the
actual location of the cellular phone users they call since a cellular phone’s area code only
suggests the location of the cellular phone subscriber at the time she purchased the phone,
not where she travels at any given time. See Allan Saxe, Can You Hear Me Now?, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 7, 2004, at B9, available at 2004 WLNR 1812040.
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VoIP

What Is VoIP?

VoIP and the cellular phone technology that preceded it
25
fundamentally change our communications.
Before VoIP and the
widespread adoption of cellular phones, the PSTN exclusively carried
voice communications, while the Internet separately connected
computers to facilitate the sharing of data applications like e-mail,
26
spreadsheets, pictures, music, and e-commerce. But VoIP technology
brings together voice, fax, and data communications in a single device,
27
routing them over the Internet to intended recipients.

25
Although VoIP telephony was invented nearly 10 years ago, it “penetrated mass
consumer consciousness” in 2004 when the availability of high-speed Internet access made
VoIP telephony services fast, cheap, and reliable. See Glyn Moody, VoIP on the Line,
NETCRAFT, June 14, 2004, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/06/index.html (“[i]n
the early years of the Internet as a mass medium, the average user’s dial-up connection was
too slow” for voice to be clearly transmitted over Internet and “variable net reliability
meant that packets were often delayed or dropped, leading to chopped speech, audio
artifacts and noticeable delays”); Ellen Muraskin, An Explosive Year for VoIP, EWEEK.COM,
Nov. 25, 2004, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1730777,00.asp. This
past year, the number of VoIP providers has greatly increased. See Ken Belson, Cable’s New
Pitch: Reach Out and Touch Someone, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at A5 (noting that traditional
phone companies like Verizon, AT&T, and SBC Communications are developing Internetbased phone services); Muraskin, supra. The Federal Communications Commission’s
(“FCC’s”) “hands-off policy on VoIP regulation” also encouraged more providers to enter
the marketplace this year. Id.; see In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 22,425
(2004) (deeming state regulation of VoIP services preempted by Telecommunications Act of
1996, which gave FCC exclusive jurisdiction over information services like VoIP). The FCC
has explained that its ruling “clears the way for increased investment and innovation in
services like Vonage’s to the benefit of American consumers.” Id. at 22,405.
26
See Ron Vidal, Enhancing 911: How VoIP Technology Can Improve Public Safety,
TELECOMM. MAG., Sept. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.level3.com/userimages/
dotcom/pdf/Enhancing_911_White_Paper.pdf.
27
See Daniel Terdiman, Internet Phones Arrive at Home (And Some Need No Computer),
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at C9 (describing how VoIP technology allows telephone
conversations to be made across Internet rather than exclusively over regular phone lines);
see also Scott Kirsner, Hold the Phone, FAST CO., Mar. 2004, at 96, available at http://
pf.fastcompany.com/magazine/80/telephony.html (noting that Internet-based phones can
display webpages on their screens, allowing companies to publish data to their employees’
phones); Neil Randall, CNET Review of AT&T CallVantage, CNET.COM, Mar. 22, 2005,
http://reviews.cnet.com/AT_T_CallVantage/4505-9238_7-30923419-2.html?tag=glance
(explaining that AT&T’s CallVantage VoIP service allows subscribers to send faxes over
VoIP phones); Texas Instruments, VoIP Solutions:
Overview Webpage,
http://focus.ti.com/docs/apps/catalog/overview/overview.jhtml? templateId=975&path
=templatedata/cm/level1/data/bband_voip_ovw (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (advertising
Texas Instrument’s VoIP software as enabling equipment manufacturers to develop
products that send real-time voice, fax, and data over packet networks).
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VoIP technology operates by converting analog signals (e.g., voice or
28
fax) into digital data packets and by transmitting the data to a recipient
29
over the Internet Protocol (“IP”) network. VoIP subscribers send faxes,
make unlimited local and long-distance phone calls, and send data for a
30
31
low monthly fee through their personal computers and laptops,

28
Dan Gillmore, Give Swedish Firms Credit for VoIP Underlying Software, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, June 13, 2004, at 1F. Whereas the circuit-switched telephone system keeps
a dedicated line open between two callers over copper wires or fiber-optic cables, VoIP’s
packet-switching system breaks data into small packets, attaching an IP-address to each
packet that tells the network the data packet’s final destination. See Jeff Tyson & Robert
Valdes, How VoIP Works, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ip-telephony.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2006). While the packets may travel different paths to their final
destination, the receiving computer or phone reassembles the data packets into their
original state for the recipient. Id.
29
See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and
the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 840 (2004) (describing IP layer of Internet). IP
describes the way in which packets of data (i.e., small groups of bits and bytes) are sent and
received over the Internet. See Russell Shaw, Say Hello to VoIP, TECHLIVING, Apr. 20, 2005,
at 56, available at http://www.techliving.com/article/829.html (explaining that data-packet
transfer over IP occurs in same way with voice and fax as it does when downloading
webpage or sending and receiving e-mails). The IP network moves data packets without
geo-location information, “reveal[ing] nothing about the user . . . and very little about the
data exchanged.” LAWRENCE L. LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 32 (1999).
The geographic location of the sender and recipient is not “known by the system or
knowable by us in looking at the data.” Id. at 32. Such a minimalistic design ensures
network efficiency. Id. at 33. Professor Lawrence Lessig aptly summarizes the design of IP
as “a carnival funhouse, with the lights dimmed to darkness and voices coming from
around you but from people you do not know and from places you cannot identify.” Id.
30
See Belson, supra note 25, at A5. Fees vary depending on the services purchased by
the user. For example, AT&T CallVantage subscribers pay $29.99 per month for unlimited
local and long distance calls. See Randall, supra note 27. Vonage’s Premium Unlimited
Plan costs $24.99 per month for unlimited calls anywhere in the United States and Canada,
voicemail, caller ID, call forwarding, and 3-way calling. See Vonage Homepage,
http://www.vonage.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); see also Texas Instruments, supra note
27 (explaining that VoIP services offered by Texas Instruments eliminates per-minute longdistance fees associated with traditional, circuit-switched telephone service).
31
VoIP subscribers can make phone calls over their computers in two ways. First,
VoIP providers like Vonage provide their customers with VoIP software that enables users
to place calls from their computers so long as they have a headset, a microphone, and a
connection to the Internet. See Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28. Second, companies like
Skype offer free software that connects voice communications over PCs that use Skype
software. See Skype, Hello. We’re Skype and We’ve Got Something We’d Like to Share
with You Webpage, http://www.skype.com/products/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
Subscribers talk into microphones or headsets attached to their computers, and the Skype
software digitizes the analog voice signals into data packets and distributes the data over
the Internet to end-users. Id. Users cannot call out to numbers with NANP area codes
unless they have signed up for additional paid plans like SkypeOut that allow subscribers
to call those numbers on a per-minute basis. Id. In addition to voice telephony, the Skype
software permits subscribers to share files and send instant messages. Id.; see Craig Ellison,
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traditional telephones, and IP-enabled or wireless phones.
2.

The Borderless Nature of VoIP Communications

As VoIP telephone numbers are tied to subscribers, VoIP transmits
voice, fax, and data communications without regard to geography by
enabling subscribers to select any desired area code for their phone
34
numbers. VoIP subscribers also may bring their office and home phone
35
numbers with them wherever they travel. VoIP technology removes
the barriers of location imposed on voice and fax communications in the
36
traditional telephone system by allowing subscribers to send faxes and
37
make phone calls contingent only on high-speed Internet availability.

Talk Is Cheaper, PC MAG., Feb. 8, 2005, at 108 (describing Skype’s computer telephony
service).
32
Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28. After signing up with VoIP providers, subscribers
need a high-speed Internet connection, a telephone adapter, and a conventional analog
phone to activate their VoIP service. See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108.
33
Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28. An IP phone looks just like a normal phone with a
handset and cradle but is connected to the Internet by an RJ-45 Ethernet connector. Id.; see
also Terdiman, supra note 27, at C9 (explaining that IP phones work by connecting Ethernet
cable from broadband source into RJ-45 Ethernet IP phone and another Ethernet cable from
IP to PC). Wi-Fi IP phones are also available, allowing subscribing callers to make VoIP
calls from any Wi-Fi hot spot. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 165 (discussing how VoIP
permits users to talk, fax, and share files over their phones, computers, and personal digital
assistants while bypassing traditional phone system when user has access to broadband);
UTStarcom, F1000G Specsheet, http://www.utstar.com/Document_Library/0554.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (describing UTstar F1000G Wi-Fi mobile handset, which has threeway calling, call rejecting/redial/mute, call waiting, call transfer, and call forwarding,
among other services).
34
See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
35
See Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that VoIP “lets workers bring their own phone
extensions to branch offices and hotel rooms”).
36
See MCI, MCI Advantage:
Technical Diagram, http://global.mci.com/us/
enterprise/voice/voip/index.xml (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (trumpeting mobility,
efficiency, and affordability of VoIP services in comparison to “Old World” circuitswitched telephony where people needed three or more networks for data and voice
communication, including data/IP network, long-distance provider, and local call
provider, and where closed architecture of traditional telephone system foreclosed kind of
mobility now available with VoIP, and noting that traditional telephone providers charged
extra for any moves, additions, or changes to existing structure that VoIP providers do not).
37
High-speed access to the Internet is often referred to as “broadband,” a term which
means a “higher-speed transmission of data over an ‘always-on’ connection.” Enrico C.
Soriano et al., Internet Developments: A Look at Key Issues Currently Shaping Broadband
Deployment and Regulation, in 21ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY &
REGULATION 2003, at 177 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. G0-015D, 2003); see Robert W. Crandall et al., Universal Broadband
Access:
Implementing President Bush’s Vision, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 2004, at 523 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

1494
a.

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1481

Area Codes No Longer Signal Geographic Locations

Unlike the traditional telephone system, VoIP area codes are not
designed to reflect subscribers’ physical locations. When replacing
traditional telephones with VoIP, subscribers need not retain local area
codes on their phone numbers. This is because VoIP phone numbers
correspond to the subscribers themselves and to their portable Analog
38
Telephone Adapters (“ATAs”), not to the location of their residences or
39
40
offices. As such, VoIP users may select any available area codes for
their ATAs and purchase additional “virtual” numbers that route calls to
41
their ATAs. Thus, a VoIP area code has no geographic significance
with regard to a subscriber’s location.
Vonage, a cutting-edge VoIP provider, explains that area codes
provide subscribers with a virtual presence in different states “without
42
the substantial overhead.” This enables customers or friends sharing a
43
subscriber’s area code to call the subscriber cheaply.
It also helps
44
attract customers to businesses. For example, a company located in
Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 3202, 2004).
38
An ATA is an analog-to-digital converter that takes the analog signal from a
traditional phone and converts it to digital data for transmission over the Internet. Tyson
& Valdes, supra note 28. The ATA facilitates the packet-switching at the heart of VoIP
technology. Id. If the recipient of a call uses a traditional telephone, VoIP technology
reassembles the data packets and converts them back to analog form. Id.; see Ellen
Muraskin, Service Touts VoIP Perk — Without the Hardware, EWEEK.COM, Nov. 18, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1729497,00.asp (describing VoIP service offered
by CallWave that intercepts calls made to subscribers’ existing phone numbers and
forwards calls over Internet instead of over PSTN).
39
See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108.
40
Id.;
see
Vonage,
Listing
of
Available
Area
Codes
Webpage,
http://www.vonage.com/avail.php (last visited July 18, 2005) (explaining that with
Vonage, users “are no longer tied to [a] ‘local area code’” and may choose any area code
from its list). As Vonage highlights: “Even if you live in New York, you can have a
California number.” Id.; see Randall, supra note 27 (noting that AT&T’s CallVantage
subscribers can select from up to 39 area codes).
41
Ellison, supra note 31, at 108; see Vonage, Virtual Phone Number Webpage,
http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=virtual_phone_number (last visted Jan. 18,
2006) (describing Vonage’s virtual phone number service).
42
Vonage, supra note 41. Vonage asks consumers to “imagine having business cards
with New York, London, and Mexico City satellite office numbers” for less than $5.00 per
month each. Id.
43
Id.; see also Randall, supra note 27 (describing virtual number service offered by
AT&T’s CallVantage, called Simple Reach Numbers, as giving subscribers second number
outside their area codes so that callers in those areas covered by second number, such as
relatives or business partners, can make local phone calls to subscribers).
44
Offering customers the opportunity to use local area codes makes it cheaper for
customers to call businesses outside of their home states, since the customers avoid longdistance charges in calling them. See Vonage Launch Underlines Importance of Numbering
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Durham, North Carolina, may purchase VoIP phone numbers with
Chicago and Los Angeles area codes in the hopes of generating business
45
there. That company might also buy another VoIP number with a 212
46
area code to ensure its listing in New York City’s Yellow Pages. Because
VoIP area codes are assigned to people and their ATAs, not to locations,
VoIP technology removes the geographic marker from the
communications it transmits. VoIP represents a radical departure from
the controlled, traditional telephone system where area codes signal the
location of telephone and fax users.
b.

The Mobility of VoIP

VoIP’s
mobility
renders
the
notion
of
location-specific
communications meaningless because VoIP subscribers bring their VoIP
numbers with them wherever they travel so long as they have access to
47
broadband. For example, a VoIP subscriber from Texas who plugs her
ATA into a hotel telephone in Beijing, China, and logs onto the Internet
48
can make and receive phone calls in China as if she were at home. As
49
the CEO of Vonage explains, the “whole basis” of VoIP is “mobility.”
But such portability, a critical feature of VoIP technology, precludes VoIP
50
providers from ascertaining the precise location of their subscribers.
Policy, POL’Y TRACKER, Mar. 13, 2005, http://www.policytracker.com/headlines.php
[hereinafter Vonage Launch].
45
See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108.
46
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 166. However, decoupling telephone numbers from
geographic regions risks consumer fraud. See Vonage Launch, supra note 44. For example, it
becomes “cheap and easy for a small company to give the false impression that it has
offices all over the country.” Id.
47
See Vonage, Take Vonage with You Webpage, http://www.vonage.com/
features.php?feature=traveling (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (explaining that Vonage
subscribers can “[t]ake Vonage wherever [they] go” so long as subscribers have their ATAs
and broadband Internet connection). Vonage explains that “[w]hen visiting family, going
on vacation or traveling for business, [a subscriber] can make and receive calls from one
convenient Vonage number.” Id. Moreover, a Vonage customer using a Wi-Fi handset
designed by UTStarcom has access to its phone service so long as the subscriber talks in a
Wi-Fi network. Wilson Rothman, Over There? Call for Less, TIME, Apr. 25, 2005, at A3,
available at http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press_news.php?PR=2005_04_25_0.
48
See John C. Dvorak, Free Phone Calls, PC MAG.COM, July 29, 2003,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,1206172,00.asp. John Dvorak, a reporter for PC
Magazine, explained that while traveling to New York from California, he connected his
ATA to his hotel phone and his laptop and “[v]oilá! A dial tone,” as if he was at home in
California. Id. Dvorak received his home phone calls in his hotel room in New York,
thousands of miles from his home. Id.
49
See Vonage Launch, supra note 44.
50
See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 33. As the FCC has explained, and as the VoIP
industry has applauded, portable VoIP services are offered “independent of geography.”
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The serious problems VoIP providers have had connecting their
51
subscribers to geographically-appropriate 911 Emergency Response
Centers or Public Safety Access Points (“PSAPs”) demonstrates the
52
inability to ascertain the geographic location of VoIP communications.
This is because 911 calls are routed based on the calling number’s area
code, which accurately reflects a traditional telephone user’s geographic
53
location but not a VoIP subscriber’s locale.
The Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has attempted to mitigate this
problem by requiring VoIP providers to connect their subscribers to
PSAPs covering the geographic areas that the subscribers have reported
54
as their locations. VoIP providers must notify subscribers that they
have a duty to inform and to update their VoIP providers about their
55
precise locations to ensure the proper routing of 911 calls.
The FCC’s Order, however, provides an imperfect solution to the 911
56
problem since the proper routing of VoIP 911 calls is not automatic. It
depends on a VoIP subscriber’s vigilant updating of her location
57
information with her VoIP provider.
If a VoIP subscriber travels
outside of her reported locale and neglects to update her location
information with her VoIP provider, that subscriber’s 911 calls will not

Id. Thus, VoIP providers cannot discern their subscribers’ geographic locations. Id.
51
Id. at 15; see, e.g., Carol Wilson, E911 Decision Adds More Fuel to Voice-over-IP Blaze,
TELEPHONY, May 23, 2005, at 8 (discussing problems raised by FCC’s requirement that VoIP
providers connect users to appropriate emergency service stations).
52
See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 22. PSAPs differ from 911 Emergency Response
Centers (“E-911”) in that callers must tell PSAP personnel their location, whereas
traditional E-911 providers automatically receive location information from traditional
telephone service providers based on the calling telephone number’s area code. See
Vonage, Vonage Provides 911 Webpage, http://www.vonage.com/features.php?
feature=911 (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
53
See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that 911 problem stems from inability
of VoIP providers to “discern from where their customers are accessing the VoIP service”
given VoIP’s portability).
54
See id. at 22. The FCC Order requires local phone companies to give VoIP providers
access to their E-911 networks. Id.
55
Id. at 32.
56
Id. (noting that it is not “technologically feasible for providers of interconnected
VoIP services to automatically determine location of their [subscribers] without [their
subscribers’] active cooperation”).
57
Id. The FCC ruled that VoIP providers must give their subscribers “one or more
methods of updating [their] information regarding [their] physical location” to ensure that
VoIP providers always have the most current information about their subscribers’
locations. Id.; see Vonage, supra note 52 (explaining that subscribers who move or travel
must provide their new location to Vonage through their web account to ensure that their
911 calls are sent to appropriate PSAPs).
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be connected to the geographically-appropriate PSAP. Because VoIP
technology does not pinpoint a caller’s location, a fail-safe 911 solution is
59
unavailable. The 911 problem shows that VoIP technology defies the
location-identifying norm of the traditional, circuit-switched telephone
system. As Part III demonstrates, the borderless nature of VoIP will pose
serious problems for the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine as well.
c.

VoIP’s Routing Features

VoIP eliminates the predictability of the location of calls to VoIP
subscribers in a variety of ways. VoIP technology, for example, allows
60
subscribers to receive calls in multiple locations at once. Thus, a VoIP
subscriber from California, who owns additional residences in Colorado
and Idaho, can program her VoIP phone number to ring simultaneously
61
at both of her vacation homes during a winter trip. VoIP also enables
subscribers to forward their VoIP numbers to multiple phones, resulting
58

Indeed, VoIP subscribers’ lack of reliable access to PSAPs has been blamed for a
number of critical injuries and deaths. See Donny Jackson, Public Safety Gets Its Wish,
MOBILE RADIO TECH., June 1, 2005, at 6 (describing incident in February 2005 when teen
could not connect to 911 via her VoIP phone after her parents were shot by intruder, and
noting another situation in March 2005 when three-month old baby died because her
mother’s 911 call from her VoIP phone was routed to answering machine). Thus, a VoIP
subscriber who tells his VoIP provider that he lives in Arizona may call 911 while on a trip
to Boston. However, his 911 call will be routed to a PSAP in Arizona where his VoIP
provider believes he is located, not where he is hurt and needs help. See David Pace,
Internet Phone Companies Must Provide 911 Service, INTELLIGENCER (Wheeling, W. Va.), May
20, 2005, at 6A.
59
See Press Release, Vonage, Vonage Completes Successful “Enhanced 911” Trial for
VoIP Users with Rhode Island Public Safety (Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.vonage.com/media/pdf/pr_10_14911intrado_04.pdf (describing innovations
that permit Vonage to provide Rhode Island’s E-911 services with caller’s location and
callback number, but that information provided to 911 is only accurate if caller is actually
in geographic location on file with Vonage). Cellular providers have only recently
provided uniform E-911 service to subscribers pursuant to an FCC ruling requiring cellular
phone providers to do so no later than December 31, 2005. See 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18
(2004). Unlike VoIP providers who lack the ability to pinpoint their subscribers’ precise
geographic locations, cellular companies can locate their customers geographically using
satellite-based global positioning technologies and by tracking signals from cellular towers.
Thus, they are able to comply with the FCC’s 911 Order. See Recent Development, Who
Knows Where You’ve Been?: Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal
Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-09 (2004).
60
See Ellison, supra note 31, at 110-11 (describing services offered by AT&T’s
CallVantage and Lingo’s VoIP services).
61
See Mark Gibbs, Avoiding the Death of a Thousand Pecks, NETWORK WORLD, June 27,
2005,
at
92,
available
at
http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2005/
062705backspin.html (describing service provided by VoIP provider Vonage that allows its
subscribers to have incoming calls ring simultaneously or sequentially at different
designated phone numbers).
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62

in endless routing possibilities.
Thus, telephone calls to VoIP
subscribers end up in locations callers have no reason to know or
anticipate, further illustrating the inability to pinpoint the geographic
location of VoIP communications.
3.

SoIP: VoIP’s Future
63

SoIP, the future applications of VoIP, will erase the limitations of
geography beyond voice and fax communications, revolutionizing the
way in which people and businesses establish a virtual presence in far64
away locations. In a movement called “network convergence,” Internet
telephony providers are developing applications that will allow IPenabled telephones to receive and send phone calls, faxes, e-mails, data
65
files, and high-quality real-time videos.
This will allow VoIP
subscribers to talk and swap files simultaneously and to leave voice
66
messages along with document attachments.
Another SoIP in
development, “unified messaging,” will permit subscribers to receive
their VoIP communications in the most convenient manner to the VoIP
67
user at the time of reception.
Not only will VoIP efficiently carry all of our communications, it will
do so from a single point of contact. Companies are rapidly developing
more integrated services known as “fixed mobile convergence” that will
68
allow VoIP users to have one device for all of their communications. As

62

See Ellison, supra note 31, at 112.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 166.
64
“Network convergence” refers to the goal of integrating data, voice, and video over
a single network infrastructure, which would improve efficiency, flexibility, and cost
through a “single infrastructure and cabling plant for data, voice, and video.” Michael J.
Vincent, Presence: The Case for Adopting a Converged Network 3 (Apr. 2005)
(unpublished whitepaper), available at http://www.ins.com/downloads/whitepapers/
ins_wp_converged_network_0405.pdf.
65
Dan McLean, e-Insider: VoIP Pointing Way Toward Complete Convergence, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 28, 2005, at B10 (describing emerging business applications of VoIP
that allow doctors to collaborate from remote locations through multimedia links).
66
Id.
67
See Computacenter, Network Convergence 9-10 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished
whitepaper), available at http://www.cw360ms.com/research/whitepapers/Network%20
convergence%20white%20paper%20Final.pdf (explaining that unified messaging
technology allows voice messages to be translated into e-mails while recipient is in meeting
or, when same person is out in field, retrieves voicemail as e-mail and delivers it to that
person’s mobile personal digital assistant); see also Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that
when vice president of VoIP innovator Avaya, Jorge Blanco, commutes to work “he listens
to his unread e-mails, spoken by voice synthesizer, and [to his] unheard voice mails”).
68
See Tim Greene, Mobile VoIP Set to Roam Even Wider, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 17, 2005,
at 24; see also Mobile Pipeline, Blackberry to Get Enterprise Wireless VoIP, INTERNET WK., June
63
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Sanjay Jhawar of BridgePort explains, “fixed-mobile convergence”
permits highly mobile professionals to bring together their office phone,
mobile phone, and e-mail addresses to a single point of contact that is
69
accessible at all times.
For example, Avaya and Motorola have
developed a dual-mode phone, a hybrid device that enables individuals
70
to move seamlessly between office Wi-Fi, public wireless hotspots, and
71
cellular networks. Thus, when the emerging SoIP technologies come to
the market, individuals will conduct their business and personal affairs
from a single IP-enabled device — sharing and commenting on work
files, talking to friends, e-mailing business partners, and faxing
materials — wherever broadband or wireless hotspots exist without
72
regard to their location.

15, 2005, http://www.internetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=164303433
(explaining that technology companies Research In Motion and Avaya are working to add
wireless VoIP capabilities to Research In Motion’s Blackberry device so that consumers can
communicate more effectively).
69
See Jeff Vance, When Wi-Fi Meets Cellular, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 14, 2005, at 46,
available at http://www.networkworld.com/techinsider/2005/031405tiwireless3.html.
70
Voiceover WiFi refers to VoIP wireless phones and VoIP softphone software on a
wireless PC. See Greene, supra note 68, at 24. Experts project that by the end of 2007 there
will be a total of about 182,000 hot spots worldwide with over 60,600 of them in the United
States. Id. This development will make use of VoIP wireless phones more likely in the
future. Id.
71
See Vance, supra note 69, at 46. The dual-mode phone functions as a VoIP phone in
the office and, as the user moves out of the office, acts as a cellular phone. Id. A wireless
gateway “manages the handoff between the two networks,” while the IP telephony
software permits features commonly associated with desk phones, like conferencing. Id.
The handset can access data and voice applications on both networks. Id. Thus, a “doctor
starting a phone conversation in the hospital via Wi-Fi could walk out of the building, get
in a car, and drive away but continue the call because the network flipped it over to a
cellular network.” Greene, supra note 68, at 24.
72
VoIP and the emerging SoIP innovations enable employees to work virtually from
“wherever they are — whether at home, the airport, a customer site, or an overseas field
office.” Joanne Cummings, Masters of the Virtual World, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 25, 2005, at
76, available at http://www.networkworld.com/nw200/2005/042505virtualvendors.html;
see David Kirkpatrick, Gates and Ozzie: How to Escape E-mail Hell, FORTUNE, June 27, 2005, at
169 (discussing how 21st century technologies fundamentally change way we work and
live). Microsoft’s Ray Ozzie remarked that:
Every place you can identify a boundary — from a national boundary, to
boundaries between federal, state, and local, to boundaries between home and
work — something is causing it to blur. We have as an industry traditionally
built technology to serve those boundaried entities. What excites me is that we
can mold technologies into a form that matches the changing nature of business
and work.
Id. at 172.
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VoIP also will play a significant role in our future communications
73
given its superior performance in times of national crisis. For example,
a VoIP subscription enabled the Mayor of New Orleans to reach
President Bush after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the city’s traditional
74
telephone lines and cell towers. The current efforts in Mississippi and
Louisiana to restore communication services in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina are relying heavily on wireless services in light of the
considerable damage to the fiber-optic cable lines of the traditional
75
telephone providers.
The accessibility of VoIP, coupled with its innovative features, low
76
cost, speed, and efficiency, will undoubtedly result in VoIP’s
77
widespread use in the future. Whereas twentieth century individuals

73
Christopher Rhoads, Cut off: At Center of Crisis, City Officials Faced Struggle to Keep in
Touch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
74
Id. (explaining that New Orleans mayor and his team of city leaders had no way to
communicate with outside world for two days after Hurricane Katrina hit city, until
member of mayor’s technology team realized that he had set up Internet phone account
with Vonage that he could use to connect with outside world once emergency power
returned to Hyatt hotel where they sought shelter). On August 31, 2005, the mayor’s team
made its first outside call in two days and reached President Bush. Id.
75
Dibya Sarkar, Congress Seeks Improved Disaster Communications, FED. COMP. WK., Sept.
26,
2005,
available
at
http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press_news.php?PR=
2005_09_26_0 (noting that BellSouth plans to rebuild communications systems in ravaged
Gulf Coast areas with VoIP and fiber-optic systems); Carol Wilson, Long Road to Recovery
Begins After Gulf Coast Hurricane, TELEPHONY, Sept. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
14837178.
76
See Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that VoIP subscribers using wireless phones
make and receive calls without airtime costs of cellular phone usage). Just as VoIP users
avoid airtime costs for cellular phone usage, VoIP users also avoid the per-call costs of
long-distance communication in their monthly call packages. Id.; see also Trope, supra note
19, at 64 (asserting that because “VoIP service is free from most, if not all, state and federal
regulation taxes and tariffs” that are imposed on traditional telephony providers, VoIP
service is usually 10% to 30% less expensive than traditional PSTN service). According to
Mike Volpi, Cisco’s Senior Vice President for routing technology, VoIP changes the
telephony industry from making money from “distance or how long you talk” to doing so
based upon “value [created] around voice communication.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at
166. Volpi explained that, in the future, the “voice will be free; it’s what you enable
customers to do around it that will differentiate companies.” Id.
77
See also Matthew Friedman, VoIP Market Projected to Hit $4 Billion, INTERNET WK.,
July 20, 2005, http://internetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=166401191
(explaining that VoIP in North America is “on the brink of a phenomenal growth spurt
over the next six years” when VoIP revenues will likely reach $4.07 billion, up 1300% from
$295.1 million in revenues in 2004); cf. Mobile, VoIP Replacing Traditional Voice Service,
Researcher Says, MOBILE PIPELINE, June 22, 2005, http://www.techbuilder.org/news/
164901850 (explaining that analysts predict that by 2010, 60% of households in Western
Europe will abandon their landlines for VoIP or cellular service). Compare Trope, supra
note 19, at 65 (noting predictions by experts that VoIP use could increase from its current
level to 40% of consumer market by 2008, and arguing that VoIP’s popularity suggests
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and businesses communicated with far-flung places through a myriad of
media, including the mail, the traditional telephone, the cellular phone,
and the computer, individuals in the twenty-first century using VoIP and
SoIP technologies will radically change that scenario. In the future, all of
the ways in which individuals and businesses establish a virtual
presence outside their home fora — e-mail, voice, fax, file-sharing, and
real-time video — will increasingly occur over VoIP-enabled devices that
have no geographic markers.
Because our national economy is driven largely by the interstate
connections we establish over modern communication technologies,
VoIP will increasingly affect commerce. As a result, litigation and issues
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the twenty-first century will increasingly
involve VoIP communications.
The next part will consider the
application of the modern law of personal jurisdiction to borderless
communications. As the following sections demonstrate, the profound
technological changes ushered in by VoIP and SoIP will undermine the
very premises of the Court’s existing minimum contacts doctrine.
II.

THE TRADITIONALLY HARMONIOUS PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIAL
CONTACT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT CLASH IN BORDERLESS
COMMUNICATION CASES

The modern minimum contacts doctrine rests on the twin normative
pillars of state sovereignty, springing from a nonresident’s territorial
conduct in the state, and implied contract, derived from a nonresident’s

impending restructuring of telecommunications infrastructure of United States), with
Belson, supra note 25, at A5 (comparing 180 million wire-line users and 173 million
cellphone users with 1.5 million VoIP subscribers in early 2005). Former FCC Chairman
Michael Powell has called VoIP a “killer application,” FCC Chief in VoIP Warning, FIN.
TIMES LONDON, May 5, 2004, at 28, that will “turn the telephone industry on its head and
remake it[] into something that consumers are going to find enormously valuable.” Chris
Walsh, VoIP Hailed as the Future: FCC Chairman Predicts Net-Based Calling to Spur Phone
Industry Revolution, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), May 5, 2004, at 4B.
Indeed, providers of traditional telephone services like the regional Bells, longdistance providers, and cable companies are following the lead of private companies by
offering VoIP services. Muraskin, supra note 25; see Belson, supra note 25 (explaining that
traditional phone companies like Verizon, AT&T, and SBC Communications are
developing their own Internet-based phone services). Not surprisingly, however, the
traditional Bell companies that are tied to their millions of miles of copper phone lines “are
loath to get into the digital phone market for fear of cannibalizing their core product.” Id.
Instead, many Bells are trying to keep customers by packaging their traditional phone lines
with cheap broadband connections, cellular service, and video programming from satellite
television providers. Id.
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78

purposeful contact with the forum. Concepts of territoriality in the law
of personal jurisdiction emerged in the nineteenth century when the
Supreme Court limited state adjudicative power to people and property
79
located within a state’s borders.
The minimum contacts doctrine
80
adopted in the middle of the last century expanded the notion of
territoriality justifying a state’s judicial authority to include nonresidents
81
who conducted litigation-raising activity in the state. A nonresident’s
82
constructive presence in the state, established by the nonresident’s
litigation-related local activity, secured the state’s “sovereign power to
83
try” nonresidents in its courts.

78
See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(Scalia, J.) (explaining that minimum contacts doctrine operates by analogy to concepts of
presence); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (“[T]he constitutional
touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in
the forum state.”).
79
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 422, 42627 (1808).
80
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
81
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (holding that, following
International Shoe, “defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’” with forum could
“take the place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdiction”); ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that minimum contacts
jurisprudence has developed as “surrogate for [physical] presence in the state because a
state’s sovereignty remains territorial and its judicial power extends over only those
persons, property, and activities in its borders”); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L L. 1167, 1169-70 (1998) (explaining that modern
articulation of personal jurisdiction doctrine “continued to be tied to [a] place, but [is]
measured by a more complex relationship with the defendant than simply the location of
his body”).
82
This Article uses the terms “constructive presence,” “territorial contact,” and
“territorial conduct” to refer to a nonresident’s litigation-raising activity within a state’s
territory, a critical prerequisite to a state’s exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a
nonresident under the minimum contacts doctrine. I invoke the concept of “constructive
presence” because the Supreme Court, in its adoption of the minimum contacts doctrine in
International Shoe, relied upon notions of presence in articulating the quality of a
nonresident’s in-state conduct that would warrant judicial jurisdiction.
See text
accompanying notes 106-12. Also, the Supreme Court in its most recent personal
jurisdiction decision, Burnham, conceptualized the minimum contacts doctrine as one
developed by analogy to concepts of presence. See text accompanying note 123. This
Article views the terms “constructive presence,” “territorial contact,” and “territorial
conduct” as useful rhetorical devices to identify a nonresident’s in-state activity, the
cornerstone of the minimum contacts doctrine. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-76. Others
might decline to use the term “constructive presence,” preferring “sufficient contacts” or
the like. Although legitimate reasons exist to employ different terms to refer to the
defendant’s in-state, litigation-related activity, this Article conceives the above-mentioned
terms as useful devices, leaving resolution of any weakness in using them for another day.
83
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
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The implied contract theory of the modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine reflects due process limits on a state’s exercise of its adjudicative
84
authority. Under that theory, a state’s exercise of its judicial authority
over a nonresident would be reasonable and hence comport with due
process if the nonresident purposefully connected with, and implicitly
85
subjected herself to, that state’s authority. The due process analysis, in
that regard, reflects an implied agreement between the defendant and
86
the forum.
In designing the purposefulness inquiry in the mid to late twentieth
century, the Court appropriately presupposed that telephone technology
87
connects individuals in identifiable locations.
In cases involving
traditional telephone contacts, the concepts of territorial contact and
implied contract were in sync because nonresidents purposefully
connected with particular fora based on the area codes of the telephone
numbers they called.
In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court last ruled on personal
88
jurisdiction, however, communication technologies have changed
radically. In the 1990s, cellular phone technology disconnected voice
communications from fixed locations, allowing individuals to make and
receive calls outside the geographic regions covered by their phones’
area codes. Thus, the traditionally consonant notions of territorial
contact and implied contract clashed when a phone number’s area code
failed to signal the forum a nonresident actually contacted when calling
a cellular phone user. In such circumstances, a nonresident could not
impliedly agree to face jurisdiction in a particular forum, leading some
courts to find that calls to cellular phone users lacked jurisdictional

84

See id. at 297-98.
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
86
See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 721 (1987).
87
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that given “inescapable fact of modern
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire
communications across state lines,” physical presence within state is not required to justify
personal jurisdiction so long as defendant “purposefully directed” his actions to forum
residents).
88
In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of tag jurisdiction. Burnham v.
Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (upholding
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant on grounds that defendant was physically served
with process while visiting forum state). But the Court last specifically ruled on the specific
jurisdiction theory of the minimum contacts doctrine in the 1980s. See Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
85

1504

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1481

import, no matter the harmful communications such calls transmitted to
89
a forum state.
A.

Twin Pillars: Territorial Sovereignty and Implied Contract in the Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction

This subpart traces the central organizing principles of the law of
personal jurisdiction: territoriality and implied contract. It explores the
sovereignty concerns underlying the constructive presence inquiry and
the due process protections provided by the implied contract theory.
Section 1 shows how territorialist concepts developed in personal
jurisdiction law and then looks at the significance of a nonresident’s
territorial conduct in the modern minimum contacts doctrine. Section 2
describes the implied contract rationale of the purposefulness inquiry in
the minimum contacts doctrine.
1.

State Sovereignty: The Significance of Territoriality in the
Minimum Contacts Doctrine
90

An abiding feature of the law of personal jurisdiction is that a
defendant’s activity within a forum’s borders warrants the exercise of
91
that state’s adjudicative authority over the defendant.
Although
territoriality concepts appeared in jurisdiction decisions as early as

89
See infra notes 242-57 (describing jurisdictional rulings involving cellular phone
contacts).
90
Part II focuses on the significance of territoriality, implied contract, and “fair play
and substantial justice” in the minimum contacts doctrine. For a comprehensive
explanation of the evolution of the law of personal jurisdiction, see Robert J. Condlin,
“Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances?”: It’s Time for the Supreme Court to
Straighten out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (2004).
91
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609, 620 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (finding that personal
jurisdiction theory adheres to “the principles traditionally followed by American courts in
marking out the territorial limits of each State’s authority,” using defendant’s activities in
forum as “substitute” for physical presence); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur
common understanding now, fortified by a century of judicial practice, is that jurisdiction is
often a function of geography.”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
293 (1980) (“[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution.”); see also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and
Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (arguing that Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine
hinges on notions of territorial sovereignty over nonresidents’ acts within its borders);
Stein, supra note 86, at 689 (explaining that law of personal jurisdiction ultimately addresses
allocation of sovereign authority); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal
Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 404 (1985) (explaining that basic principle of personal
jurisdiction law is that state’s authority is limited to controlling transactions, things, or
people connected to its territory).
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92

1808, the Supreme Court made it clear personal jurisdiction was a
function of a state’s boundaries in its landmark 1877 Pennoyer v. Neff
93
The Court decided Pennoyer at a time when individuals
decision.
largely conducted their business affairs locally and rarely traveled
94
between states.
In Pennoyer, an Oregon state court asserted jurisdiction over, and
issued a default judgment against, a nonresident, defendant Neff, where
95
the only notice plaintiff provided the defendant was by publication.
Neff claimed that the federal court had no obligation to give full faith
and credit to the state court’s judgment given Oregon’s lack of
96
jurisdiction over him.
Justice Field, writing for the Pennoyer Court,
97
agreed. The Court ruled that a state’s adjudicatory authority extended
only to nonresidents physically served in the state’s borders or to
nonresidents whose in-state property had been attached at the outset of
98
the litigation. The Court reasoned that because every state possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within
its borders, “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over

92
See D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1851) (refusing to recognize New York
judgment against Louisiana resident because, under “well-established rules of international
law,” New York court abused its power by rendering judgment over Louisiana resident
who had not been personally served in New York and who owned no property there);
Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 485-86 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“[J]urisdiction cannot be
justly exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons
not owing them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their
limits.”); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 422, 426-27 (1808) (explaining that court’s
jurisdiction attaches when person or property falls within sphere of state’s authority); see
also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 27374 (1990) (explaining that early history of state court decisions concerning personal
jurisdiction reveals courts’ concern with issues of interstate sovereignty, reflecting
competing visions of Federalists and Antifederalists in post-Revolutionary era); Roger H.
Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871
(1989) (explaining that before adoption of Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, Supreme Court
had developed federal common law rules defining state court’s personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents based on territorial concepts drawn from principles of public international
law).
93
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process
Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 570 (1958)
(explaining that Pennoyer stands as source of modern law of personal jurisdiction).
94
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); see MITCHELL,
supra note 10, at 165-66 (describing that communications in pre-industrial communities
were largely limited to towns where people lived).
95
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
96
See id. at 721-22.
97
Id. at 733.
98
Id. The Court also recognized personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
who consented to the court’s jurisdiction. Id.
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99

persons or property without its territory.”
Pennoyer reflected the territorial conception of jurisdiction in cases like
100
D’Arcy v. Ketchum that limited state judicial authority to people and
101
102
property within a state’s borders.
The Pennoyer Court, in dictum,
tied these principles to the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that
proceedings in a court “to determine the personal rights and obligations”
of parties over whom the court lacks jurisdiction do not “constitute due
103
process of law.”
The Court defined the jurisdictional right protected
by the Due Process Clause as the individual’s right to be free from
104
illegitimate assertions of state authority.
The twentieth century’s sea change in transportation and
105
communication technologies prompted the Court in International Shoe

99
Id. at 722, 733. The Court, citing Justice Story’s treatise on the conflict of laws,
explained that because the several states possess equal authority and the independence of
one state “implies the exclusion of power from all others,” a state’s exertion of power
beyond its borders “is a mere nullity” and “incapable of binding such persons or property
in any other tribunals.” Id. at 722-23.
100
52 U.S. 165 (1851).
101
LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 25 (1986).
102
The Court’s discussion of the Due Process Clause constituted dictum because the
Fourteenth Amendment, whose Due Process Clause (unlike that in the Fifth Amendment)
applied to the states, had not yet been ratified at the time of the state-court judgment
against Neff. BRILMAYER, supra note 101, at 25 n.26.
103
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-34 (“As stated by Cooley in his Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations . . . for any other purpose than to subject the property of a nonresident to valid
claims against him in the State, ‘due process of law would require appearance or personal
service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.’”); see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241,
258-62 (contending that Justice Story, who based his writing on work of Dutch jurist Huber,
influenced basic organization and intellectual structure of Court’s decision in Pennoyer);
Kogan, supra note 92, at 300 (arguing that Justice Field, while influenced by Justice Story’s
explanation of international sovereignty, “metamorphosed” personal jurisdiction doctrine
from doctrine of international law to doctrine of personal rights protected by Constitution
against overreaching of states).
104
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see Kogan, supra note 92, at 298, 337 (explaining that, in
Pennoyer, “Justice Field viewed the personal jurisdiction doctrine as one important means
by which federal courts could police the states with respect to upholding the civil rights of
American citizens” protected by Reconstruction Amendments).
105
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (noting that Court shifted from
rigid rule of Pennoyer to flexible minimum contacts inquiry to account for technological
progress of 20th century that “increased the flow of commerce between the States” and
thus amplified need for jurisdiction over nonresidents); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (attributing expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in International
Shoe to great changes in modern transportation and communication in 20th century that
fundamentally changed national economy).
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106

Co. v. Washington to expand forum-court jurisdiction beyond people
and property located in a state’s borders to include nonresidents whose
107
Although geography
forum activities gave rise to the litigation.
remained the central “organizing principle” in the personal jurisdiction
108
analysis,
International Shoe replaced the strict physical presence
requirement of Pennoyer with the flexible “minimum contacts”
109
approach.
Under the minimum contacts doctrine, the Court focused
on whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s litigation-related
110
activities in the forum warranted the state’s judicial authority.
The International Shoe Court began by reaffirming that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects nonresidents from the
111
binding judgment of fora lacking jurisdiction over them.
The Court
further held, however, that a court could acquire jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants on the basis of their litigation-raising “contacts,
112
ties, or relations” with the forum state.
Under the minimum contacts
doctrine, a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident comports
with due process so long as the nonresident’s activity in the forum state
gave rise to the lawsuit and maintenance of the suit would not “offend
113
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
With International Shoe, the Court shifted from the strict territorial
114
paradigm of Pennoyer to a “neoterritorialist” approach based upon the
“quality” and “nature” of a nonresident’s litigation-related acts in the
115
state.
This shift, however, was a measured one. In describing the
activities that would meet or fall short of the “quality and nature”
inquiry, the Court continued to rely upon the concept of territorial

106

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316.
108
Stein, supra note 81, at 1169.
109
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (holding that jurisdiction would be appropriate under
minimum contacts approach despite fact that defendant had not been served within state
and consent to suit could not be implied as Pennoyer approach requires).
110
Id. at 319.
111
Id. at 316.
112
Id. at 319.
113
Id.
114
Stein, supra note 81, at 1169-70; see Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939,
943 (4th Cir. 1994) (following International Shoe, “[a] state’s jurisdictional power remains
territorial, to be exercised within its boundaries over persons, property and activities
there”).
115
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (holding that “Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity [in the forum] in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.”).
107
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116

“presence.”
The Court, identifying the type of contact that would
squarely merit jurisdiction over a nonresident, explained that
“[p]resence” is not “doubted” where the defendant’s “continuous and
117
systematic” activities in the forum “give rise to the liabilities sued on.”
Conversely, jurisdiction would offend due process if a nonresident had
only a “casual presence” in the forum or conducted “single or isolated”
118
activities in a state that lacked a connection to the lawsuit.
Personal jurisdiction law, to date, finds its principal justification in
119
120
territorialist concepts.
By predicating a state court’s exercise of
121
specific jurisdiction on a nonresident’s litigation-raising activity in the
state, the Supreme Court has made clear that the minimum contacts
doctrine is geographically prescribed. Justice Scalia, in Burnham v.

116

Id. at 316-17; see also Kogan, supra note 92, at 351 (arguing that International Shoe
adopted conceptual structure of Pennoyer by relying on notions of presence but suggested
that changing times required that concept be more broadly construed than mere physical
location). Professor Kogan remarked that International Shoe did not abandon Pennoyer’s
requirement of presence, but “merely said that the concept must be renovated to suit the
circumstances of modern society.” Id. at 352.
117
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
118
Id.
119
See BRILMAYER, supra note 101, at 31.
120
Courts variously refer to a nonresident defendant’s litigation-raising acts in the
forum as “affiliating circumstances,” “surrogates for presence,” and conduct establishing a
“substantial connection” with the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (refusing to find jurisdiction over defendants in Oklahoma due to
absence of any “affiliating circumstances” by defendants with forum to justify state’s
adjudicatory power over them); ESAB Group., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th
Cir. 1997) (explaining that “the jurisprudence of minimum contacts has developed as a
surrogate for presence”); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 487 (1985)
(upholding jurisdiction over Michigan defendant in Florida based on his “substantial
connection” with Florida); see also Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods.
Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction over
corporate defendant in breach of contract action where defendant performed no conduct in
Pennsylvania that warranted state’s exercise of adjudicative authority because defendant’s
solicitation and negotiations of contract occurred in California, none of defendant’s
personnel ever visited Pennsylvania, defendant delivered its products to California, and
only contact defendant had with Pennsylvania constituted informational calls it made to
plaintiff that had no impact on negotiation or execution of contract); Mesalic v. Fiberfloat
Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding personal jurisdiction over defendant
in New Jersey given defendant’s extensive contact with plaintiff in New Jersey concerning
contract at heart of the lawsuit, including his sending written correspondence to plaintiff’s
New Jersey residence, calling plaintiff at his New Jersey residence, delivering boat to
plaintiff in New Jersey, and coming to New Jersey to repair boat); Beck v. D’Amour, 923 F.
Supp. 196, 200-02 (D. Utah 1996) (refusing to find jurisdiction over defendant in Utah in
stock conversion action because tort of conversion and injury occurred in Thailand where
defendant looted contested funds and because defendant conducted no acts relevant to
litigation in Utah).
121
See supra note 5 (describing specific jurisdiction theory addressed in this Article).
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122

Superior Court of California, affirmed the abiding significance of territory
in current personal jurisdiction law by describing the minimum contacts
123
doctrine as one “developed by analogy to physical presence.”
124
Professor Lea Brilmayer views a nonresident’s litigation-related
125
activity within a state as invoking that state’s “territorial sovereignty.”
126
A nonresident’s forum contacts “count” and thus justify the exercise of
judicial jurisdiction because a state has the right to regulate a
127
nonresident’s activity within its borders.
When basing judicial
122

495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.).
Id. at 618-19 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (stating, “as International Shoe suggests,
the defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical
presence as the basis for jurisdiction” because “minimum contacts” standard was
developed as a “substitute” for physical presence requirement of Pennoyer). As Lesnick
held:
123

[W]hile International Shoe expands upon the notion of “presence” to provide
flexibility to accommodate the increased flow of commerce between the states,
the standard for imposing jurisdiction over persons outside the state has
remained one that depends on a measure of the person’s activity in the state
coupled with the constraint that the state’s exercise of such power would not
offend traditional notions of fair play.
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 942 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see
also Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial
Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 1025 (1992)
(remarking that in Burnham plurality, Justice Scalia articulates that “presence is the
paradigm of all jurisdiction”).
124
Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of
Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 457 (2004) (“[P]ersonal
jurisdiction limits are based on a view about the limits of state sovereignty.”); Allan R.
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory
Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 416 (2004) (explaining that “defendant’s individual due
process right to be free from illegitimate authority is a perfect vehicle to protect state
sovereignty”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 383 (arguing that personal jurisdiction law is
deduced from “general federalism-related territorial limitations on state sovereignty”).
125
See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 28. Professor Arthur Weisburd persuasively
analogizes the territorial concepts underlying a state’s judicial authority over nonresidents
to the territorially driven understanding of a state’s power to tax and to prosecute
criminals. Weisburd, supra note 91, at 391-98. For Professor Weisburd, the due process
limits on a state’s judicial jurisdiction, tax jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction in
criminal matters all “trace back to the common basic principles that the sovereignty of
other states limits a state’s authority and that a state’s authority extends only to that which
affects its territory.” Id. at 402. Thus, “[l]ocal presence of at least part of transactions,
conduct or events is not merely sufficient, but is necessary to permit the state to assert
[personal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 404.
126
The phraseology “how contacts count” comes from the title of Professor Lea
Brilmayer’s seminal 1980 article, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77.
127
Id. at 87. Professor Brilmayer explains that “[t]he two bases of jurisdiction —
unrelated and related contacts — . . . constitute alternative aspects of a State’s sovereignty,
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jurisdiction on a nonresident’s contacts with the forum, the state “merely
requir[es] the defendant to bear the costs arising out of [his] occurrences
128
in the forum.”
Under this theory, the minimum contacts doctrine
expanded a state’s “internal regulatory authority” to include
129
nonresidents who conducted litigation-raising activity there.
This interpretation finds strong support in World-Wide Volkswagen
130
Corp. v. Woodson.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause limits a state’s sovereign adjudicative powers and
that such limits cannot be satisfied by showing that it would not be
131
inconvenient for the nonresident to defend itself in the forum.
The
Court explained that because due process restrictions “are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States,” the Due
Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
132
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” For the World-Wide
Volkswagen Court, a nonresident’s minimum contacts implicated the

namely, self governance and territoriality.” Id. On the one hand, a defendant’s systematic
unrelated activity in a state, like being domiciled, being incorporated, or doing business in
a state, suggests that the person or corporate entity is “enough of an ‘insider’” so that he
may safely be relegated to the state’s political processes. Id. On the other hand, jurisdiction
based on a defendant’s litigation-raising activity in the forum stems from a “regulatory and
territorial justification.” Id. Under that theory, the state uses the defendant’s in-state
conduct to gauge whether such conduct warrants state judicial regulation. Id. at 88; see also
Stein, supra note 86, at 761 (explaining that jurisdictional rules define “when and how a
state may command obedience from an individual”).
128
Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 87.
129
Stein, supra note 86, at 696 (contending that, since Pennoyer, Court has expanded
jurisdiction from strict territorialism to recognizing acts that warrant state’s adjudicative
authority based on relationship formed by individual with state). The minimum contacts
doctrine signaled that the sphere of a state’s legitimate authority “must be determined by
subtler standards than the defendant’s current location” as required by Pennoyer. Id. at 710.
130
444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
131
Id. The Court explained that even though the “progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome,” the
trend in technology does not herald the demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts because such restrictions are “more than a guarantee of
immunity” from inconvenient litigation.” Id.
132
Id. Professor Wendy Purdue describes World-Wide Volkswagen as reflecting two
critical points: “[F]irst, that personal jurisdiction limits are based on a view about the limits
of state sovereignty; and second, that purposeful availment is the correct measure of state
sovereignty within our federal system.” Perdue, supra note 124, at 457. Professor Perdue
argues, and this Article agrees, that “[i]t is important to differentiate between these two
propositions because one can readily accept the first while rejecting the second.” Id.; see
infra Part III.C (arguing that purposefulness and its implied contract approach can be
eliminated from personal jurisdiction law and other means provided to ensure that state’s
exercise of its judicial authority is reasonable).
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sovereign state’s “right to regulate activities” within its borders. The
Court reasoned that the “Framers . . . intended that the States retain
many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
135
sovereign power to try causes in their courts.” As the Court explained:
“[T]he reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must
136
be assessed ‘in the context of our federal system of government.’”
The question of whether state sovereignty remained an essential
feature of personal jurisdiction was notably implicated in Insurance Corp.
137
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee. There, Justice White,
writing for the majority, found that the defendant had waived his
personal jurisdiction defense by failing to respond to court-ordered
138
discovery on the issue.
The Court, in its decision, considered the
defendant’s argument that the due process rights implicated by the
personal jurisdiction doctrine were akin to Article III’s guarantees with
139
regard to subject-matter jurisdiction that could not be waived.
The
Court found the defendant’s argument unavailing: whereas subjectmatter jurisdiction exclusively concerns a federal court’s power to hear a
case regardless of a litigant’s interests, restrictions on “state sovereign
power” in personal jurisdiction matters stem from an “individual’s
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause” that an individual
140
may waive.
With this reasoning, the Insurance Corp. majority made
clear that the right to resist unconstitutional assertions of personal
jurisdiction rests with the individual, not the states vis-à-vis each other.
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, however, warned that the
Insurance Corp. majority had suggested a sweeping revision of the

133
See Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 85 (arguing that World-Wide Volkswagen illustrates
“regulatory and territorial justification” of minimum contacts doctrine); Stein, supra note
124, at 412 (“[The] individual liberty interest of defendants protected by [World-Wide
Volkswagen] is ultimately measured by whether a state is acting within its legitimate sphere
of sovereign authority.”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405 (exploring how World-Wide
Volkswagen supports view that personal jurisdiction law stems from “limits on state
sovereignty inherent in the United States governmental structure”).
134
Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293,
294-96 (1987) (explaining that adjudicative jurisdiction fundamentally concerns state’s right
to exercise coercive power over individual or dispute); Perdue, supra note 124, at 457.
135
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
136
Id. at 293-94. The Court explained that “we have never accepted the proposition that
state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to
the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.” Id. at 293.
137
456 U.S. 694, 695, 702-03 (1982).
138
Id. at 703-04.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 702, 703 n.10.
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modern personal jurisdiction doctrine by replacing the minimum
contacts requirement with an exclusive focus on “abstract notions of fair
141
142
play.” The majority disagreed. Justice White, relying on World-Wide
143
Volkswagen, responded that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion of Justice
Powell, our holding does not alter the requirement that there be
‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and the forum
144
state.” The majority instead explained that the World-Wide Volkswagen
principle that personal jurisdiction reflects the “character of state
sovereignty” is “ultimately . . . a function” of a nonresident’s due process
145
rights and thus can be waived by the nonresident.
For that reason,
minimum contacts “can be established when a defendant fails to comply
with court-ordered discovery” on the contested issue of personal
146
jurisdiction.
Justice White’s majority decision did not eliminate a sovereign state’s
judicial authority over a nonresident’s acts within its borders. Rather, it
held that the due process protections afforded nonresidents by the
minimum contacts doctrine belong to those nonresidents and are
147
waiveable by them. Thus, the sovereignty theory underlying personal
jurisdiction law remained intact after Insurance Corp. — whether a state’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident exceeded the state’s
148
judicial authority.
Insurance Corp. simply clarified that the right to
141

Id. at 710, 714 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 703 n.10.
143
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). Professor
Weisburd persuasively argues that Insurance Corp.’s reliance on World-Wide Volkswagen
undermines any suggestion that Insurance Corp. implied that personal jurisdiction law no
longer concerns “territorial sovereignty.” Weisburd, supra note 91, at 412-13. For Professor
Weisburd, if the Court meant to eliminate state sovereignty from the personal jurisdiction
calculus, “one would expect its footnote to characterize the World-Wide [Volkswagen]
rationale as incorrect” since World-Wide Volkswagen held that sovereignty concerns compel
the minimum contacts inquiry. Id. at 413. Because Insurance Corp. reaffirmed the WorldWide Volkswagen minimum contacts test, Insurance Corp. cannot be read to sever sovereignty
considerations from the minimum contacts doctrine. Id.
144
Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Perdue, supra note 124, at 458 (rejecting suggestion that Insurance Corp. undermined
notion that “personal jurisdiction is doctrine that allocates sovereignty”); Stein, supra note
86, at 712 (arguing that Insurance Corp. did not disturb Court’s approach on how to measure
legitimacy of state’s exercise of judicial authority under minimum contacts doctrine and
regulatory theory underlying contacts inquiry, but instead found that right to resist
unauthorized jurisdiction rests with individual, not states); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 415
(arguing that Insurance Corp. did not say that personal jurisdiction does not flow from
sovereignty limitations but rather that “once [the court] has gone through process of
142
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resist a state’s unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction belongs to
149
individuals, not to the states.
Supreme Court decisions following Insurance Corp. affirm the
sovereignty theory underlying the territorial contact inquiry of the
150
151
minimum contacts doctrine.
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the Court,
describing the significance of a defendant’s purposeful forum contacts,
explained that “parties who ‘reach out beyond one state and create
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state’
are subject to regulation and sanction in the other state for the
152
consequences of their activities.” Territorial sovereignty thus remains
153
a central feature of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.
State sovereignty principles similarly animate the Supreme Court’s
rulings on the constitutionality of state punitive damages awards under
154
the Due Process Clause. Notions of territorial sovereignty prominently
155
appeared in BMW v. Gore. There, the Court explained that a state may
award punitive damages if such awards advance the state’s legitimate
156
interest in punishing and deterring unlawful conduct.
State punitive
damages awards, however, would offend due process and its protection
against “arbitrariness” if such “award[s] can fairly be categorized as
157
‘grossly excessive’ in relation to [a state’s] interests.”
For the Court,

determining the limitations that sovereignty imposes on personal jurisdiction, the rules that
one deduces remain merely personal rights, waiveable by the persons involved”). But see
Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of
State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 81, 83-86 (1984) (describing Ins. Corp. as critical
departure from “previous articulations of due process requirements” concerning
significance of state sovereignty).
149
Stein, supra note 124, at 415.
150
See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (Scalia, J.) (finding that current minimum contacts doctrine permits defendant’s
“litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ to take the place of physical presence” as basis for
state’s jurisdictional authority over defendant); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[The]
state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its
territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make the
exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable.” (quotation marks omitted)).
151
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
152
Id. at 473 (quoting Traveler’s Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)); see
also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“[I]t is beyond dispute that
[a state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the
State.”).
153
Busch v. Buchman, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994).
154
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003); BMW of
N.A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
155
BMW, 517 U.S. at 572-73.
156
Id. at 568.
157
Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993).
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“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
158
the penalty that a State may impose.”
The Court tied the due process “excessiveness inquiry” to the
159
territorial limitations on state sovereignty. The Court explained that an
award’s “excessiveness” depends upon the “state interests” served by
160
the punitive award.
Analogizing the scope of a state’s authority to
award punitive damages to a state’s power to tax, the Court explained
that “no single State . . . [can] impose its own policy choice[s] on
161
neighboring States.”
The Court held that “principles of state
sovereignty and comity” suggest that a “State may not impose economic
sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
162
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”
163
In 2003, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
Court considered whether a Utah jury’s $145 million punitive damages
award offended the due process rights of a defendant insurance
164
company accused of fraud. At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of
the defendant’s deceptive practices in Utah and across the United
165
States. The Court held that the Utah jury should have been instructed
that it could not punish the defendant for its out-of-state conduct
because Utah “does not have the power” to punish the defendant for its
166
actions that had no impact on Utah or its residents.
The Court
reasoned that in considering out-of-state conduct to support its punitive
damages award, the jury offended “a basic principle of federalism . . .
that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what

158

Id. at 574.
Id. The Court, in assessing the severity of the penalty a state may impose, relied on
three guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, and (3) the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases. Id. at 574-75. The Court’s three-part inquiry ensured that the defendant
had “adequate notice” of the penalty it would face. Id. In so finding, the Court analogized
the constitutional safeguards afforded to defendants facing civil penalties to the
“judgments without notice” due process protections in the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Id. at 575 n.22 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
160
BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
161
Id. at 571.
162
Id. at 572.
163
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
164
Id. at 412.
165
Id. at 420.
166
Id. at 422.
159
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conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State
alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a
167
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”
The Court’s sovereignty theory in its punitive damages decisions
mirrors the rationale animating the territorial contact inquiry of the
168
minimum contacts doctrine.
Just as Campbell recognized that a state
may punish a defendant’s conduct within its territorial borders, personal
jurisdiction law upholds a state’s judicial authority over a nonresident’s
169
in-forum activity. According to Professor Michael P. Allen, the Court’s
“strong territorialist” and interstate federalism approach in Campbell
suggests that the Court’s future personal jurisdiction decisions will
170
emphasize state sovereignty as its underlying rationale.
The minimum contacts doctrine recognizes a state’s judicial authority
over nonresidents who established their constructive presence in that
state, an approach resembling each state’s authority to award punitive
damages based on a defendant’s activity within its borders. The next
section addresses how the Due Process Clause limits a state’s exercise of
its judicial jurisdiction to nonresidents who purposefully connect with a
state and thus impliedly agree to face litigation there. The Supreme
Court relies on a nonresident’s implied intent in order to assess the
reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its authority over that resident.

167

Id.
Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages, and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 60-63 (2005) (analogizing sovereignty-based rationale of punitive
damages decisions of BMW and Campbell to territorial model underlying personal
jurisdiction doctrine); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 238 n.266 (2004) (“Like
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the emerging doctrine limiting punitive damage awards has
a distinct interstate federalism flavor to it.”).
169
In comparing the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine to its punitive
damages decisions, this Article acknowledges that issues concerning punitive damages
reflect tort reform concerns, among other issues, that the personal jurisdiction doctrine
does not. This Article simply points to the Court’s punitive damages decisions as an
illustration of other areas that reflect the territorial limits of state authority in a due process
analysis.
170
Allen, supra note 168, at 63. In his discussion, Professor Allen recognizes that
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has “at its roots a strong notion of state sovereignty.”
Id. at 61. He notes that the Court greatly limited interstate federalism and sovereignty as
“driving jurisdictional forces.” Id. at 62. Although this Article disagrees with Professor
Allen on this point, see text accompanying notes 137-53, it agrees that Campbell makes it
more likely that the Court will craft its future personal jurisdiction decisions “with an eye
more directly focused on state sovereignty.” Id. at 63.
168
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Due Process Limits: The Implied Contract Theory in Modern
Personal Jurisdiction Law

The Due Process Clause, “acting as an instrument of interstate
171
federalism, may sometimes divest the State of its power” to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents despite their territorial conduct
172
in the state because the nonresidents never purposefully connected
173
with that state.
Purposefulness is satisfied where nonresidents
174
deliberately directed “some act”
to the forum such that they could
175
The
have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” there.
purposefulness inquiry protects nonresidents from facing lawsuits in
176
jurisdictions based on a third party’s acts
or the nonresidents’
177
“accidental” or “attenuated” contacts with the state.
The Court designed the purposefulness requirement to ensure that the
state’s exercise of its judicial authority would be reasonable “in the

171

World-Wide Volkswagen v.Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State . . . .”).
173
Id.
174
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 n.18 (1985). A defendant’s single
act related to the forum may not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction if it is not reasonably
foreseeable that the defendant would be haled into the forum’s courts based on that act. Id.
175
Id. (explaining that Due Process Clause may not be used as shield to “avoid
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297. Purposefulness can also be demonstrated by placing products in the stream of
commerce or by committing an intentional tort like defamation or libel, where the
defendant targeted the plaintiff who the defendant knows lives and works in the forum.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1987); see Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (upholding California court’s personal jurisdiction over writer and
editor, who worked for National Enquirer in Florida, in lawsuit alleging defendants libeled
actress plaintiff in magazine article because defendants “expressly aimed [their article] at
California,” defendants knew that plaintiff lived and worked in California, and National
Enquirer had its largest circulation in California such that defendants could “reasonably
anticipate” being haled into court in there). Under the Calder “effects” test, defendants
illustrate a purposeful connection with a forum state by their intentional conduct in the
forum state that is “calculated to cause injury” there. Id. at 791. The Calder Court described
the purposefulness test as satisfied by a defendant who expressly aimed his tortious actions
at a particular forum to harm the plaintiff there. Id. at 789. The Court has variously
referred to purposefulness as voluntary or deliberate behavior aimed at the forum.
176
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (holding that unilateral activity of third person cannot be
imputed to defendant in purposefulness analysis).
177
This “ensures that a defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is not based on
fortuitous contacts,” but on the defendant’s “real relationship with the state with respect to
the transaction at issue.” Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773,
780 (7th Cir. 2003).
172
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178

context of our federal system of government.”
This means that the
nonresident must have had “fair warning” about where her conduct
179
would render her liable to a lawsuit and the opportunity to “structure
[her] primary conduct” to “alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation”
by “procuring insurance” or by “severing [her] connection” to the
180
state.
The purposefulness inquiry, in turn, promotes the “orderly
administration of the laws” by “giv[ing] a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will
181
and will not render them liable to suit.” Thus, a state may reasonably
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who purposefully
connect with the forum because those nonresidents chose to enjoy the
benefits of conducting activities in the state, including the right to resort
to the forum’s courts, and thus assumed the concomitant “obligation” to
respond to lawsuits “aris[ing] out of” or “connected with” their conduct
182
there.
The Court’s articulation of the purposefulness inquiry suggests that a
forum court’s sovereign authority over nonresidents stems from an
183
implicit agreement between the nonresidents and the forum.
For

178
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93 (finding that Due Process Clause serves
two different functions in personal jurisdiction arena: (1) securing “fairness” embodied in
“fair play and substantial justice” factors, and (2) ensuring “reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant . . . ‘in the context of our federal system of government’” by
requiring that claims in lawsuit arise from or relate to nonresident’s purposeful, litigationraising activity in state (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945));
Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 85 (arguing that “the sovereignty concept inherent in the Due
Process Clause is not the reasonableness of the burden [borne by the defendant] but the
reasonableness of the particular State’s imposing it.”). Professor Brilmayer notes that the
Supreme Court measures the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its regulatory
authority by asking whether the defendant was “responsible for those [in-forum]
occurrences.” Id. at 89. So interpreted, the “Due Process Clause seems to require that the
person who would suffer the deprivation have some contact with the State by which he has
subjected himself to its power.” Id.; see also Stein, supra note 86, at 711 (“Due process
protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally, through its protection
of the individual from illegitimate assertions of state authority. Legitimacy, though, is
defined by reference to the state’s allocated authority within the federal system.”). For
Professor Stein, an individual’s due process rights “inescapably are linked to the allocation
of sovereign authority.” Id. at 706.
179
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-74.
180
Id.
181
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
182
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76.
183
See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 1 (asserting that minimum contacts doctrine
embodies theory of contract law by incorporating exchange of promise analysis).
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184

example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, while living in New
York, bought an Audi automobile from the defendant Seaway, an Audi
185
As the plaintiffs drove through
dealership located in New York.
186
Oklahoma, their car caught fire after another automobile hit them. The
plaintiffs brought a products liability suit against the defendants Seaway
and World-Wide Volkswagen, the Northeast regional car dealership, in
187
Oklahoma state court.
The Court found that Oklahoma lacked
jurisdiction over the defendants because they did not deliberately seek
out the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law: they did not sell cars
there, solicit business there, or attempt to serve the Oklahoma market in
188
any way.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court defined the judicial jurisdictional
189
reach of a state in contractual terms by focusing on whether the
nonresidents actually or impliedly agreed to enjoy Oklahoma’s laws in
exchange for their obligation to defend a lawsuit that arose from their
190
activities there. The World-Wide Volkswagen finding that the defendants
184

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
Id. at 288.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 295.
189
Id. Although contracts can be established either expressly or impliedly by parties,
express and implied contracts do not differ in their legal effect, as the only difference lies in
the respective obligor’s method of manifesting assent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 4, cmt. a (1981). The purposefulness inquiry evolves from the tenets of
implied contract, as the assent given by both the forum and an out-of-state resident is a
legal fiction. See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 19-20. An implied contract exists when the
courts infer the obligor’s assent based on the obligor’s conduct or other nonverbal evidence
of consent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 4, cmt. a (describing
elements required to satisfy implied contract). As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
explains, the assent or “consideration” necessary to create a valid contract revolves around
an exchange of promises or performances. Id. § 71(1). In an implied contract, the
contracting parties are presumed to “bargain” for this exchange and to return promises or
performances predicated on that bargain. Id. § 71(2); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 1.1, 2.4 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that contract is only valid if
parties bargained for exchange). What matters is “not what is bargained for” but “that each
person’s promise or performance is induced by the other’s.” Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 287 (1986) (emphasis added). The bargained-for
exchange rationale allows for “private planning and to prevent the weight of legal coercion
from falling upon those informal or ‘social’ arrangements where the parties have not
contemplated legal sanctions for breach.” Id. at 289; cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106-07 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining different theories of justice in
contractual terms by asking whether contract was agreed to and if it was fair).
190
See Stein, supra note 86, at 690 (noting that contractual justification has predominated
Court’s decisions for past 40 years with World-Wide Volkswagen as primary example of view
that state’s regulatory sphere for jurisdictional purposes rests on consensual, contractual
arrangement between defendant and forum state). Several court decisions reflect the
185
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had not deliberately sought out the benefits of Oklahoma law to justify
extraterritorial jurisdiction over them suggests that purposefulness
191
requires a “meeting of the minds”
between the defendants and the
forum. With its contract justification, the minimum contacts doctrine
aims to ensure that a nonresident defendant impliedly agreed to the
192
forum state’s judicial jurisdiction.
A state court’s assertion of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
depends on a nonresident’s constructive presence in the state and that
nonresident’s implied agreement that, in exchange for the opportunity to

notions of implied contract in the minimum contacts doctrine. See Heritage House Rests.,
Inc. v. Cont’l Funding Group, Inc., 906 F.2d 276, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that
defendant purposefully availed himself of protections and benefits of Illinois law when he
made misrepresentations at heart of lawsuit during phone calls and in letter that he
directed to plaintiff in Illinois); Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant physician in Texas in medical malpractice lawsuit
because defendant purposefully conducted activities in Texas by shipping drugs to plaintiff
from California to Texas on three occasions and by calling plaintiff’s physician in Texas to
monitor plaintiff’s condition, thereby invoking benefits of Texas law and accepting burden
of facing suit there); Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512 So.2d 1334,
1336 (Ala. 1987) (upholding jurisdiction over nonresident car seller in Alabama where
defendant purposefully directed its marketing efforts to residents of Alabama and thus
availed itself of privilege of making sales to, and profits from, Alabama residents, thus,
requiring defendant to “bear the burden commensurate with the benefits [it] received from
its sales in Alabama”); Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785
(Tex. 2005) (“Jurisdiction is premised on notions of implied consent — that by invoking the
benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a nonresident consents to suit there.”).
191
Stein, supra note 86, at 721. Professor Stein has argued that with Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court made clear that the contract justification of the
purposefulness inquiry was not merely based on notions of a fair exchange of benefits for
burdens, a quasi-contractual notion, but required a “truly consensual meeting of the
minds” to support extraterritorial jurisdiction. Stein, supra note 86, at 721. In Shaffer, a
Delaware court asserted jurisdiction over the directors of a Delaware corporation in a
shareholder derivative action based on the plaintiff’s attachment of the defendant directors’
shares that, under Delaware law, were deemed to be located in Delaware. 433 U.S. at 214.
The plaintiff claimed that, in attaching the defendants’ property in the state, Delaware
obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendants who, aside from serving as directors
in a company incorporated in Delaware, had no connection with the forum. Id. The Court
held that Delaware lacked jurisdiction over the defendants because their contacts with the
state did not put them on notice that Delaware would require them to answer for their
behavior there since all of the alleged malfeasance at the heart of the shareholder litigation
occurred outside of Delaware. Id. at 216 (“It strains reason . . . to suggest that anyone
buying securities in a corporation formed in Delaware impliedly consents to subject
himself” to Delaware’s jurisdiction. (internal quotation marks omitted)). This language
suggests that the purposefulness inquiry involves notions of implied contract where the
parties knowingly exchange benefits and burdens.
192
See Stein, supra note 86, at 721 (arguing that Court, in focusing jurisdictional inquiry
on “how the defendant and [the] forum state have consensually ordered their
relationship,” has effectively privatized due process concerns underlying law of personal
jurisdiction).
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enjoy a state’s laws, she will submit to its courts’ authority. The
constructive presence and purposefulness inquiries aim to ensure that
the state court’s exercise of its authority over the nonresident will be
reasonable and hence comport with due process. The following section
describes the additional due process protections of “fair play and justice”
in the minimum contacts inquiry. These protections examine the fairness
of the state’s exercise of jurisdiction based on the prospective impact the
lawsuit would have on the parties, the court system, and the several
193
states.
3.

Additional Due Process Limits: “Fair Play and Substantial
Justice” Concerns

Under the minimum contacts doctrine, due process also requires that a
state’s exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident comports with
194
“fair play and substantial justice.” To that end, the Court assesses the
burden shouldered by the nonresidents in defending themselves in the
195
196
forum state, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
193
See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 193-94, 207 (1998) (describing considerations
of defendant’s conduct and mental state in minimum contacts doctrine as “reflect[ing] a
retrospective, i.e., ex post, viewpoint that looks back from the initiation of the lawsuit” and
that “fair play and substantial justice” concerns of judicial efficiency, parties’ convenience,
and states’ shared interests “reflect a prospective, i.e., ex ante, viewpoint that looks forward
from initiation of the lawsuit”).
194
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292.
195
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in
a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”). In Asahi, eight
Justices agreed that the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Japanese
defendant would be unreasonable given the distance the defendant would have to travel to
litigate the case and the difficulty defendant would face in submitting its dispute with the
Taiwanese company to a “foreign nation’s judicial system.” Id. Of all of the
“reasonableness” factors, the defendant’s inconvenience is “always a primary concern.”
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210
(1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that California defendant’s burden of having to litigate case in
Massachusetts is “entitled to substantial weight in calibrating the jurisdictional scales”).
The inconvenience factor weighs heavily in the jurisdictional balance of the reasonableness
factors because it provides a mechanism through which “courts may guard against
harassment.” Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211.
196
The “forum’s adjudicatory interest” inquiry assesses the forum’s interest in the
litigation without comparing the forum’s interest in the matter to other jurisdictions’
interest in the case. See, e.g., Chaiken v. VV Publ’g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that Massachusetts had no interest in hearing lawsuit about injured reputation of
plaintiff who lived in Israel); Sawtelle v. Ferrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1395 (1st Cir. 1995); Mesalic v.
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plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
198
resolution of controversies, and the common interest of all of the
199
sovereign states in furthering substantive social policies.
Courts
should decline to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if these
“fair play and substantial justice” factors overwhelmingly suggest that
200
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair.
Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that New Jersey had strong
interest in protecting its residents from out-of-state manufacturers who commited torts or
breached contracts with its residents).
197
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the
serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). The Second and Ninth Circuits have
suggested that they accord plaintiff’s inconvenience little weight. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 574 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding plaintiff’s choice of
forum irrelevant to jurisdiction inquiry); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482,
1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has given much weight to
inconvenience to the plaintiff.”).
198
See, e.g., Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 631 (5th Cir. 1999) (assessing
efficiency concerns, courts look at judicial system’s interest in adjudicating individual
claims against multiple defendants in single litigation); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins.
Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1097 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction inappropriate and forum
inefficient because insurance litigation would be governed by Canadian law); RobertsonCeco, 84 F.3d at 574 (finding Vermont inefficient forum for litigation because plaintiff did
not live in Vermont and witnesses and evidence were located outside of Vermont).
199
Courts have identified the following issues as advancing the collective interests of
the sister states: a state’s ability to provide a convenient forum for its residents to redress
injuries by nonresidents from far-flung places who connect with forum residents in “our
age of advanced telecommunications,” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395; the foreign policy interests
that arise when pursuing a case against a foreign national defendant, Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115,
Wortham v. Karstadtquelle AG (In re Nazi Era Cases), 320 F. Supp. 2d 204, 231 (D.N.J. 2004);
the enforcement of securities regulations, see, for example, Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292
F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2002); and the “widely shared interest in preserving citizens’
willingness to talk openly with the press,” see, for example, Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211.
200
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (finding that California state court improperly exercised
jurisdiction over Taiwanese valve manufacturer, even if defendant purposefully availed
itself of California market, given California’s lack of interest in Japanese company’s
impleader action against Taiwanese defendant, high burden California litigation would
impose on Taiwanese defendant, Japanese plaintiff’s slight interest in trying case in
California, and international diplomacy concerns implicated in case that counseled against
exercise of jurisdiction); id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I do agree, however, with the Court’s
conclusion in Part II-B that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi in this case
would not comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice” . . . . This is one of those rare
cases in which “minimum requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial
justice’ . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities.”). The Court, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
noted that a weaker showing of a defendant’s purposeful contact with the forum could
support forum-court jurisdiction where “fair play and substantial justice” strongly
supported jurisdiction. 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). Professor Stein argues that the
Supreme Court’s Asahi decision marked a retreat from this view. Stein, supra note 124, at
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The “fair play and substantial justice” concerns maintain an ex post
201
view of due process by examining the prospective impact the litigation
202
The
will have on the parties, the court system, and the states.
purposefulness requirement and its due process protections, in contrast,
measure the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its adjudicative
authority based on the nonresident’s territorial conduct. To that end, the
purposefulness inquiry assumes an ex ante perspective, focusing on the
nonresident’s past acts — her in-state conduct that gave rise to the
litigation — that implicate the forum state’s sovereignty.
The next subpart addresses how, in determining the reasonableness of
the state’s exercise of its judicial authority, the principles of constructive
presence and purposefulness seemingly operate in harmony in cases
arising from traditional telephone contacts. Those principles, however,
tear apart when applied to borderless cellular phone communications.
B.

The Purposefulness Inquiry Presumes that Telephones Direct
Communications to Single, Identifiable Locations

The Court designed the current minimum contacts doctrine at a time
when individuals directed circuit-switched telephone communications to
known geographic locations. As a result, the notions of territorial
contact and a defendant’s purposeful connection with a particular place
almost always ran together. That remains true in today’s traditional
203
telephone system used by 180 million U.S. residents. Communications

426. He explains that Asahi suggested that while the “reasonableness” concerns could
divest a forum of jurisdiction, those factors could not compensate for a low level of
purposefulness. Id.
201
McMunigal, supra note 193, at 194; Stein, supra note 124, at 427. Professor James
Weinstein observes that the “fair play and substantial justice” considerations protect
interests beyond the individual liberty of nonresident defendants. Weinstein, supra note
168, at 227-31. He explains that the forum state’s interest in the litigation, the interstate
judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared policy
interests of the several states protect interstate federalism concerns. Id. at 228 n.233. The
consideration of the “plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief,” Weinstein
observes, stems from “a common law rule of interstate venue by which the Supreme Court
has attempted to allocate judicial power among the states efficiently and fairly.” Id. at 229.
So, too, does the “efficient resolution of controversies” interest implicate interstate venue
considerations.
202
Kogan, supra, note 92, at 358-59 (explaining Supreme Court’s current minimum
contacts doctrine as wavering between two different approaches — interstate sovereignty
and fairness to litigants and court system).
203
See supra notes 17-20; see also Condlin, supra note 90, at 132-33 (explaining that
technology used in pre-Internet world to “extend one’s reach into other states — the
telephone, automobile, railroad, airplane, and the like — could be pointed in single
directions, so to speak”).
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over the PSTN cross state lines in predictable directions made clear by a
204
telephone or fax number’s area code. The Supreme Court’s decisions,
and those of the lower federal and state courts, reflect the presumption
that home and office telephones connect individuals in specific
205
geographic locations.
206
In Burger King, the defendant, a resident of Michigan, entered into a
franchise agreement with Burger King, a Florida corporation, through its
Michigan representatives for the operation of a Burger King restaurant in
207
Michigan.
The franchise agreement obligated the defendant and his
partner to pay Burger King over $1 million dollars during a twenty-year
208
period. Although the defendant dealt with Burger King’s district office
in Michigan, he also negotiated directly with the company’s
209
headquarters in Miami, Florida.
The defendant contacted Burger
King’s headquarters by mail and by telephone to resolve disputes over
building design, site-development fees, rent computation, and defaulted
210
payments.
When the negotiations failed, Burger King sued the
defendant and his partner in federal district court in Florida for their
211
alleged breach of the franchise agreement and trademark infringement.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that given the “inescapable
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,”
the defendant’s physical presence in Florida was not necessary for
212
jurisdiction so long as he “purposely directed” his efforts toward
213
Guided by these principles, the Court found
residents of that state.
that the defendant purposely connected with Florida by mailing letters
and placing phone calls to Burger King’s Miami office to negotiate the
214
terms of the franchise agreement out of which the lawsuit arose.
The
Court also based its finding that the defendant deliberately affiliated
himself with Florida on the length and substantiality of the commercial

204

See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206-38 and accompanying text.
206
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
207
Id. at 466.
208
Id. at 467.
209
Id. at 467 n.7.
210
Id. at 467 n.7, 468 n.9, 481.
211
Id. at 468.
212
Id. at 476. The Court noted that although “territorial presence frequently will
enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable
foreseeability of suit there,” physical presence in the state is not required. Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 481.
205
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relationship between the parties, the amount of money that regularly
flowed between Michigan and Florida related to the agreement, and the
215
choice-of-law clause in the franchise agreement. The Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in Florida based on the
defendant’s purposeful affiliation with the state and the fair play and
216
substantial justice concerns.
In Burger King, the Court viewed the defendant’s telephone calls and
letters as functional equivalents, reflecting the traditional assumption
that telephone calls, like mail, are routed to single, identifiable locations.
The Court’s presumption made sense because given the circuit-switched
telephone technology of the time, phone calls to businesses “across state
217
lines” reliably began and ended in known fora. The Burger King Court
thus appropriately framed the minimum contacts inquiry around an
individual’s purposeful connection with a forum, since area codes of the
circuit-switched telephone system clearly indicated the location of phone
calls made and satisfied the fair warning objective of the purposefulness
inquiry.
218
Lower federal and state courts presume that nonresident telephone
callers purposefully direct communications to particular fora based on
219
the area codes of the telephone numbers they call.
For example, in
220
Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc., the defendants, a California winery
and its parent company, hired the plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, to
221
work as its sales agent in the New York area.
During the plaintiff’s

215

Id. at 481, 487.
Id. at 487.
217
Id. at 476.
218
Opinions decided before Burger King, in assessing the purposefulness of a
defendant’s actions, presumed that a defendant making telephone calls avails himself of a
forum based on the telephone numbers he dialed. See, e.g., Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc.,
688 F.2d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding Mississippi court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Indiana resident based on defendant’s defamatory long-distance
telephone call to Office of United States Attorney in Oxford, Mississippi, because defendant
initiated phone call and committed intentional tort during his conversation with
Mississippi attorney); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y.
1970) (finding that California defendant’s telephone call to New York auction house to bid
on paintings during live art auction effectively “projected” defendant into plaintiff’s New
York auction room, thereby signaling defendant’s purposeful engagement of activity in
New York and justifying jurisdiction over him there).
219
See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech. Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 466-67 (D. Mass.
1997) (distinguishing website from telephone and fax calls because telephone, mail, and
telex are “singularly” directed to state based on letter’s address or “telephone or fax
number with a [particular] area code”).
220
916 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
221
Id. at 206.
216
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employment, the defendants faxed a memorandum with allegedly
222
discriminatory remarks to the plaintiff at his office.
Following his
dismissal, the plaintiff sued the defendants for religious discrimination
223
under Title VII in federal district court in New York.
The defendants moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that New
York lacked jurisdiction over them, arguing that they never knew that
plaintiff had an office there and, thus, they never purposefully connected
224
with New York with regard to the alleged discrimination. In response,
the plaintiff produced evidence that the defendants faxed the
discriminatory memorandum to his office telephone, which had a 718
area code — the area code covering the Brooklyn and Queens region of
225
New York.
The plaintiff also presented proof that the defendants
226
frequently called him at his 718 office telephone number.
227
Launer held that New York had jurisdiction over the defendants.
The district court, applying New York’s long-arm statute, held that, by
faxing and by calling the plaintiff at his 718 office telephone number, the
defendants purposefully “transacted business” there that gave rise to the
228
lawsuit. The court ruled that those calls and faxes illustrated that the
defendants deliberately availed themselves of New York law and that
the exercise of jurisdiction over them comported with fair play and
229
substantial justice.
230
Similarly, in Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, the plaintiff, an aircraft
leasing company, sued the defendant, an attorney living in Germany, for
fraud, breach of contract, and misrepresentation in federal district court
231
in Texas. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant called the plaintiff’s
employee at her home and office phones in Texas to discuss his
232
representation of the plaintiff. During those phone calls, the defendant
233
allegedly made fraudulent promises that gave rise to the lawsuit.
The defendant argued that his communications with the plaintiff’s
employee in Texas were insufficient to support a finding of minimum
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id. at 209.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 209-11.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
195 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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contacts since it was fortuitous that the plaintiff’s employee lived in
234
235
Texas.
The district court firmly rejected the defendant’s argument.
The court found that the defendant purposefully availed himself of
Texas by calling Texas telephone numbers because those calls gave rise
236
to the alleged fraud at the heart of the lawsuit.
The court found the
defendant’s argument about the fortuitous nature of the employee’s
Texas location specious since it suggested that the defendant “could mail
a bomb to a person in Texas but claim Texas had no jurisdiction because
237
it was fortuitous that the victim’s zip code was in Texas.”
The court
upheld jurisdiction over the defendant in Texas, relying on the
defendant’s deliberate telephone calls to Texas phone numbers as proof
of his “purposeful availment” of Texas and its laws and on the “fair play
and substantial justice” factors that supported the exercise of
238
jurisdiction.
Launer and Wien assumed that the area codes of the telephone
numbers called by the defendants signaled the recipients’ geographic
locations and thus the states with which the defendants affiliated
239
themselves.
Similarly, Burger King relied on the plaintiff’s telephone

234

Id. at 212-13.
Id.
236
Id. at 215.
237
Id. at 213.
238
Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction over
foreign nonresident defendant in Tennessee appropriate based on phone calls and faxes
that defendant directed to plaintiffs in Tennessee because phone calls and faxes formed
basis of fraud action and illustrated defendant’s purposeful direction of his
communications to Tennessee); Wien Air Ala., 195 F.3d at 213, 215; Hafen v. Strebeck, 338 F.
Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Utah 2004) (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant because defendant “knew when he made the alleged misrepresentations [over
the telephone] to Hafen in Utah that he was directing his conduct to a specific person in the
state” and because defendant’s misrepresentations during telephone calls formed basis of
plaintiff’s complaint); Long v. Grafton Executive Search, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D.
Tex. 2003) (finding specific jurisdiction over defendant in Texas based on defendant’s
“purposeful” telephone calls and e-mails to Texas employment agency in which defendant
allegedly defamed plaintiff and tortiously interfered with her prospective business
relations); Brian Jackson & Co. v. Eximias Pharm. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36, 37 n.6
(D.R.I. 2003) (exercising specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendant, start-up
pharmaceutical company in Pennsylvania, based on defendant’s telephone calls and faxes
over “ordinary telephone lines” to plaintiff’s Rhode Island phone number because those
telephone calls gave rise to contract litigation); Roland v. Margi Sys. Inc., 1:00-CV-00341,
2001 WL 241792, at *1-3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2001) (exercising personal jurisdiction over
California defendant in New York federal district court in employment discrimination suit
because defendant regularly contacted plaintiff at her Buffalo, New York area telephone
number in course of her work and, thus, defendant should have anticipated being haled
into court in New York for claims arising out of such conduct).
239
Wien Air Ala., 195 F.3d at 213-15; Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc., 916 F. Supp.
235
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number as the geographic marker of the defendant’s actions in Florida.
Burger King and its progeny reveal that the purposefulness standard is
built on the assumption that nonresident defendants deliberately direct
telephone communications to identifiable locations. Thus, as presumed
by Burger King and explicitly articulated in Launer, a telephone number’s
area code provides nonresidents with fair warning about the location of
their actions, thereby allowing courts to find that those nonresidents
241
deliberately availed themselves of particular fora. As the next subpart
demonstrates, this presumption fails in a world where communication
technologies do not accurately identify the locations of telephone calls,
resulting in a clash between the territorial contact and implied contract
principles at the heart of the minimum contacts doctrine.
C.

Cellular Phone Cases: Struggling to Apply the Minimum Contacts
Doctrine to Borderless Communications

Cases addressing the jurisdictional significance of cellular phone
communications demonstrate a fundamental dissonance between the
territorial contact and implied contract requirements of the minimum
contacts doctrine. Because cellular phones are mobile and can be
answered in unpredictable locations, nonresidents lack warning about
242
the states they actually contact when calling cellular phones.
Thus, a
nonresident’s calls to a cellular phone user can inflict harm within a
state’s borders, implicating traditional state jurisdictional sovereignty,
without a nonresident knowing she contacted that state.
Courts that have dealt with litigation arising out of cellular phone
contacts have weighed the implied contract theory prong more heavily,
denying states jurisdiction over nonresidents because purposeful
243
availment was absent.
Consider as an illustration Denver Truck and
244
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design and Building Services, Inc. There, the plaintiff,
a South Dakota company, hired the defendant, a remodeling company in
245
Colorado, to replace the floor in the plaintiff’s Colorado showroom.
After the plaintiff refused to pay for the work, the defendant’s attorney
called the plaintiff’s president on his cellular phone, which had a South
204, 209-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
240
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480-81 (1985).
241
Id.; Launer, 916 F. Supp. at 207, 209.
242
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
243
See, e.g., Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex.
2005).
244
653 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D. 2002).
245
Id. at 90.
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Dakota area code, and threatened to file a lien on the plaintiff’s
246
property.
The South Dakota court refused to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on the attorney’s phone call to the
247
South Dakota phone number that gave rise to the business tort claim.
Although the defendant knew that the plaintiff’s company had a South
Dakota office, the district court ruled that because “it was a cellular
phone,” the defendant’s attorney “had no idea where [plaintiff’s
248
president] actually was at the time of the call.”
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Texas in Michiana Easy Livin’
249
Country, Inc. v. Holten recently refused to uphold personal jurisdiction
over an Indiana business that allegedly made misrepresentations to a
250
Texas resident over the telephone.
There, the plaintiff, a Texan
resident, called the defendant from his Texas telephone number to
251
discuss purchasing a custom motor home from the defendant.
The
252
plaintiff bought the vehicle and had it shipped to his home in Texas.
The plaintiff sued the defendant in Texas, alleging that the defendant
253
defrauded him over the telephone.
The court held that recent changes in telephone technology made
254
reliance on telephone calls “obsolete as proof of purposeful availment.”
The court reasoned that:
While the ubiquity of “caller ID” may allow nonresidents to know a
caller’s telephone number, that number no longer necessarily
indicates anything about the caller’s location. If jurisdiction can be
based on phone conversations “directed at” a forum, how does a
defendant avail itself of any jurisdiction when it can never know

246

Id. at 92.
Id.
248
Id. Although cellular phone contacts have only been addressed in a limited number
of cases, those decisions implicitly follow the Denver Truck notion that cellular phone
contacts lack jurisdictional significance due to the geography-defying nature of cellular
phones. See, e.g., Burrows Paper Corp. v. R.G. Eng’g, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in
breach of contract action even though defendant’s agent, using his cellular phone, talked to
plaintiff while agent was physically in New York because it was “mere fortuity” that
defendant’s agent was actually in New York since his mobile phone had Virginia area
code).
249
168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
250
Id. at 791-92.
251
Id. at 781.
252
Id. at 781, 784.
253
Id. at 784.
254
Id. at 791.
247
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where the other party has forwarded calls or traveled with a mobile
255
phone?

Michiana established a bright-line rule that all telephone contacts, as a
categorical matter, lack constitutional significance under the minimum
contacts doctrine due to the geography-defying nature of twenty-first
256
century telephone communications.
The Michiana court excluded all
telephone communications from the minimum contacts analysis,
257
including, but not limited to cellular phone calls.
The Michiana and Denver Truck courts held the implied contract theory
indispensable to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and that the
absence of “fair warning” required by the purposefulness inquiry
trumped state sovereignty concerns. Those courts presumably did so to
protect the nonresident defendants from extraterritorial jurisdiction in
unexpected fora. In so finding, the courts destroyed the jurisdictional
significance of such contacts and, with it, the states’ sovereign authority
over nonresidents’ harmful communications transmitted to their
territories. Such an approach erroneously eliminates state sovereign
authority over harmful borderless communications sent to a state’s
territory in the name of a nonresident’s implied agreement with the state.
As the following part will show, purposefulness is not essential to
ensuring that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident is
reasonable.
III.

REBUILDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION THEORY FOR A
BORDERLESS WORLD

In personal jurisdiction litigation arising from borderless
communications, the emphasis on either territorial contact or implied
contract yields very different results. The Court inevitably has to decide
which of these constitutes the primary operating principle of the
minimum contacts doctrine. Subpart A argues that state sovereignty
values underlying the territorial contact inquiry deserve primacy over
the theory of implied contract. Giving the implied contract theory
preeminence in the minimum contacts doctrine risks destroying a
sovereign state’s extraterritorial adjudicative authority over
258
nonresidents’ harmful communications. Sovereignty principles are too
255

Id.
Id.
257
Id.
258
Although no court has yet addressed VoIP in the context of personal jurisdiction,
courts undoubtedly will face this issue in the near future as VoIP becomes the primary
256
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central to a healthy federalism to be sacrificed in the name of honoring a
fictional agreement between a nonresident and a forum state where a
nonresident’s due process rights can otherwise be secured.
Subpart B contends that considerations of sound judicial
administration support the elimination of the purposefulness
requirement. By favoring territorial contact over purposefulness, courts
avoid satellite litigation concerning a defendant’s intent in transmitting
calls to VoIP users whose area codes do not reflect their geographic
location. Moreover, using the territorial contact inquiry to protect state
sovereignty concerns harmonizes the Court’s seemingly contradictory
trends of decentralization, as exemplified by judicial federalism, and
centralization, as exemplified by cases defining and protecting a concept
of national citizenship. It does so by recognizing that state courts have
developed such competence that nonresidents’ interest in avoiding a
particular state’s courts is insufficient to justify the impediments to
interstate commerce that would result from preserving nonresidents’
ability to avoid litigating in particular fora.
Subpart C proposes a solution for protecting nonresidents from
unreasonable exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction once provided by
the implied contract theory. Under this solution, the reasonableness of a
state’s exercise of its judicial authority would hinge on the state’s
regulatory interest in the nonresident’s territorial conduct. To that end,
only the objective impact of the nonresident’s local activity would be
relevant. Where a state has a strong interest in the nonresident’s
litigation-related territorial activity, the exercise of jurisdiction over the
nonresident would be reasonable. If, on the other hand, the state has a
weak interest in the nonresident’s conduct, the state’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the nonresident would not comport with due process.
Without relying on the artifice of an implied contract, such a standard
will secure state adjudicative authority over harmful communications
transmitted to a state’s borders and protect a nonresident defendant
from a state’s unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction.
A.

The Twin Pillars Applied to VoIP Communications: The Threat to
Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction and a Return to Pennoyer

If the Court clings to purposefulness and its implied contract rationale
in VoIP jurisdiction cases, the theories of implied contract and territorial
contact will inevitably collide. To illustrate this clash of principles,
mode of our virtual communications as technology analysts predict. See supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
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consider this hypothetical: Corporation A (“A”), a VoIP subscriber,
operates a consulting business in Chicago that maintains Illinois,
Michigan, and New York phone numbers. Corporation B (“B”), another
VoIP subscriber, operates a business in Philadelphia. B uses telephone
numbers with Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York area codes.
B’s president sees an online listing for A’s consulting business in the
New York Yellow Pages. B’s president calls A’s New York number and
hires A to provide advice on a project. A’s employees contact B at its
New York number. Employees of A and B communicate over the
telephone and by fax. A’s employee sends a fax with critical, misleading
information to B’s New York number. Representatives of A also convey
false information to B’s president over the telephone. B relies on those
misrepresentations and suffers significant damages.
B wants to sue A for fraud in Pennsylavania where it received A’s fax
and telephone calls. Under the implied contract theory in current
personal jurisdiction law, B cannot sue A in Pennsylvania since A’s
employees never knew they called Pennsylvania. The number A dialed
in contacting B did not have a Pennsylvania area code. Thus, A never
bargained to receive protection from, and subject itself to, the laws of
Pennsylvania. Because B’s telephone number warned A that it could be
sued in New York, not Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania court would lack
jurisdiction over the fraud claim if the minimum contacts doctrine
requires purposeful availment.
On the other hand, the territoriality component of the minimum
contacts doctrine will prevent B from suing A in New York as well. A
can successfully oppose personal jurisdiction in New York because
nothing actually happened in New York that would warrant a New York
court’s adjudicative authority. Thus, if both territorial contact and
implied contract remain essential components of the minimum contacts
doctrine, personal jurisdiction over A would be inappropriate in
Pennsylvania, where primary litigation-arising activities occurred, and in
New York, where A’s employees believed they contacted B. B could sue
in A’s home state of Illinois, but may find it costly and inconvenient to
litigate its case in Illinois.
Limiting B to suing A only in the state where A can be found reinstates
259
the formalistic regime of Pennoyer v. Neff. In borderless communication
cases, requiring purposefulness effectively destroys six decades of extra260
territorial personal jurisdiction.
Such evisceration of extraterritorial

259
260

95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
Scholars have urged courts to jettison the purposefulness inquiry in cases involving
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adjudicative jurisdiction undermines the Supreme Court’s principal
purpose in designing the minimum contacts doctrine: to expand the
state court judicial authority over nonresidents’ in-forum, litigation261
262
raising activities.
It also contravenes Burger King’s
explicit
recognition that telephone communications create meaningful ties with
states that may warrant state adjudicative authority.
Such a return to Pennoyer would establish a broad and troubling
immunity from extraterritorial jurisdiction for nonresident defendants
who commit torts, discriminate, and breach contracts over borderless
communications. Because VoIP promises even more communication
and commerce across state lines than the technologies that prompted the
263
Court to abandon Pennoyer in International Shoe, a de facto return to the
nineteenth century theory of personal jurisdiction is untenable. This
264
cries out for a reformulation of the minimum contacts doctrine.
A choice between the territorial contact and implied contract rationales
of the minimum contacts doctrine is unavoidable. Some may argue that
concerns about the jurisdictional problems posed by VoIP are overstated.
They will likely assert that area codes of phone numbers will still
correspond to telephone users’ actual locations most of the time and,
thus, the territorial contact and implied contract theories will continue to
yield the same result.
That argument fails. First, preserving the implied contract theory
inevitably results in the broad rule articulated in Michiana Easy Livin’

Internet website activities because the inquiry unnecessarily usurps state adjudicative
authority. See Joel Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951,
1955 (2005) (suggesting that defendants who argue that contacts via Internet are not
directed at forum state challenge “very ability of sovereign states to protect their citizens
within their borders from online threats”); Stein, supra note 124, at 412 (arguing that
because unintended extraterritorial consequences of Internet conduct like website
marketing and defamation in chat room fall outside adjudicative authority of affected
states, purposefulness inquiry deprives states of their sovereign authority). This argument
is even more compelling in VoIP-contact cases where nonresidents direct voice, fax, and
data communications to individuals in a particular forum, albeit without knowing the
recipient’s precise location, whereas Internet websites welcome visitors but never
affirmatively direct their conduct to potential plaintiffs. Thus, a stronger argument exists
for protecting a sovereign state’s judicial authority over calls directed to VoIP users in its
territory than web marketers who post information and await visitors.
261
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
262
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480-81 (1985).
263
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
264
The Court, addressing concepts of due process, explained that “to hold that a
characteristic is essential to due process of law [because it has been the law of the land]
would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress
or improvement.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884).
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265

Country, Inc. v. Holten
that all telephone contacts, traditional or
otherwise, lack jurisdictional significance due to the borderless nature of
twenty-first century communications. This is because callers cannot
ascertain if they are dialing a traditional or VoIP number and thus do not
know if they reach a particular location by dialing a specific area code. It
also ignores the Denver Truck and Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design and Building
266
Services, Inc., finding that a strict reading of the implied contract theory
negates the jurisdictional import of all mobile communications,
including VoIP.
Second, the problem of personal jurisdiction in a borderless world will
only deepen with the projected adoption of VoIP telephony for U.S.
267
businesses and individuals in the future.
Because VoIP and cellular
phones will ultimately transmit so much of our remote communications
across state lines, interstate commerce and litigation concerning it will
268
increasingly arise from borderless communications.
As a result, the
clashing jurisdictional principles of territorial contact and implied
contract will arise with greater frequency, forcing plaintiffs to pursue
lawsuits in defendants’ home states. This clash cannot long be ignored.
As the next sections illustrate, judicial efficiency and rhetoric in legal
theory also support finding the state sovereignty concerns paramount.
Moreover, the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its sovereign
authority can be determined without sacrificing the state’s judicial
authority over harmful communications received in its territory, a risk
that clinging to the purposefulness inquiry would cause.
B.

Privileging State Sovereignty Promotes Efficient Litigation and Notions of
Judicial Federalism and National Citizenship

This subpart explores the practical support for securing state judicial
authority by eliminating the purposefulness requirement when applying
the minimum contacts doctrine to borderless communications. Section 1
identifies the judicial inefficiency engendered by the purposefulness
requirement. Section 2 identifies parallels with some of the normative
theories that arise in discussions of judicial federalism and of national
265

168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005)
653 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D. 2002).
267
See supra note 77 (describing analysts’ predictions that up to 40% of U.S. consumers
and businesses will trade their landlines for VoIP by 2008).
268
See supra notes 38-72 (discussing borderless nature of VoIP and SoIP). While this
argument certainly has merit as to cellular phones that maintain area codes intended to
reflect each subscriber’s location at the time she purchased the cellular phone, this is not
true for the area codes of VoIP phones.
266
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citizenship. It finds that this is a rare situation where the Court’s
centrifugal impulse to elevate state courts’ role and its centripal efforts to
remove parochial obstructions to interstate commerce coalesce to
support the primacy of the territorial contact pillar of the minimum
contacts doctrine.
1.

The Purposefulness Inquiry Will Generate Satellite Litigation

Elevating territorial contact over purposefulness and its implied
contract rationale serves judicial economy. The purposefulness inquiry
will entangle the courts in unnecessary satellite litigation to divine a
defendant’s actual intentions in placing a call to a VoIP subscriber.
Courts routinely permit discovery and hold evidentiary hearings on
personal jurisdiction contests addressing a defendant’s purposeful
269
connection with a forum. Litigants, and thus the courts, will inevitably
engage in extensive fact-findings and hearings about whether
nonresident callers purposefully contacted particular fora when calling
VoIP subscribers.
Indeed, one can envision countless factual issues that defendants will
raise, including allegations of trickery where VoIP area codes differ from
subscribers’ actual geographic locations and disputes concerning what
phone-call recipients with VoIP numbers told nonresident defendants
about their locations. Litigation turning on this type of subjective
inquiry is bound to congest the courts. Eliminating the purposefulness
inquiry in VoIP cases, and the satellite litigation that it will entail, will
result in a more expeditious and cost-efficient resolution of jurisdictional
litigation.

269
Courts generally refuse to dismiss a case on personal jurisdiction grounds without
permitting the plaintiff to obtain discovery on the issue. See, e.g., Androutsos v. Fairfax
Hosp., 323 Md. 634, 640 (1991); Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 535 A.2d 26 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (remanding case for discovery in personal jurisdiction contest to
uncover evidence concerning purposefulness of defendant’s activities); cf. Purdue Research
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff
must establish personal jurisdiction over defendant by preponderance of evidence when
evidentiary hearings are held by district court); LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d
1293, 1304 n.7 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that personal jurisdiction issues are decided on their
own facts and involve time and effort of courts and litigants); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 81
F. Supp. 2d 75, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering discovery in personal jurisdiction contest).
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Constructive Presence Brings Together Some Otherwise Disparate
Values Animating Judicial Federalism and National Citizenship

Viewing a nonresident’s constructive presence as the primary
principle of personal jurisdiction law would recognize a forum state’s
ability to hear claims against nonresidents while honoring relationships
individuals sustain with states outside their own. This approach
reconciles the seemingly inapposite rhetoric deployed in support of
judicial federalism, on the one hand, and national citizenship, on the
other. With regard to the former, the Supreme Court has suggested that
state courts be afforded greater respect as full partners in the federal
270
system.
Although this typically has arisen in the context of
determining whether federal or state courts should decide a dispute, a
crucial underlying issue in those cases is the competence and
271
trustworthiness of state courts.
To that end, the Court has paved a
decentralized path, placing heavy burdens on those questioning the
272
adequacy of state courts.

270

The Court’s insistence that state courts deserve respect underlies its abstention
doctrine. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)
(barring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to remedy unconstitutional administration of state tax
system because issues of state regulatory laws are more properly heard in state courts);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (holding that federal courts must abstain from
interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings unless extraordinary circumstances
show “great and immediate” threat of irreparable harm to give proper respect to state
courts); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (finding that federal
courts should refrain from exercising their authority because of “scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state” courts). Professor Martin Redish described the
federalism principles embodied in Younger as “[t]he desire to avoid affronting state judges
by questioning their competence” and to “prevent federal interference with the orderly
operation of the state judicial process.” MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 298 (1980). Another illustration of this
notion is the Court’s refusal to find federal due process issues where recourse to state
courts applying state tort law is available on the ground that state court resolution is fair
and sufficient. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (finding that
Constitution “does not purport to supplant traditional tort law” already administered by
states).
271
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322-25, 1269 (5th ed. 1996) (exploring Court’s recognition that
state courts are trustworthy and competent, reflecting parity of state and federal courts);
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441, 461 (1963) (arguing that because state courts are competent to find facts and
decide law, including matters of federal law, scope of habeas review should be narrow);
Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
605, 625, 630 (1981) (arguing that state courts are as fair and as competent as federal courts,
and noting that state courts should be treated as partners rather than as servants).
272
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY
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On the other hand, the Court’s jurisprudence under the Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause has encouraged
treating citizens as members of a single national polity. Invoking a
variety of contexts, the Court has refused to allow states to favor their
273
own. It has sought to create an environment in which individuals and
274
275
businesses can readily travel, conduct business, and even retain

L. REV. 1289, 1290, 1305-09 (2004) (explaining Court’s various judicial federalism doctrines
that accord authority to state courts because Court views state tribunals as highly
autonomous and as equal partners with federal courts in enforcing federal law). Professor
Pushaw notes that the Court has crafted numerous doctrines that enable federal judges to
decline jurisdiction in order to allow state judiciaries to hear such cases, including the
justiciability doctrine, abstention, the well-pleaded complaint rule, the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine, and sovereign immunity. Id. at 1305.
273
The Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution and the Court’s aggressive response to regulations and taxes
that tend to burden out-of-state businesses signal an evolving theory of national citizenship
that seeks to promote greater integration of citizens across state lines. Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (invalidating California welfare statute under Privileges and
Immunities Clause because it unjustly discriminated against new residents and aimed to
stem tide of people moving across state borders); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
313 (1992) (finding state use tax unconstitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis where defendant lacked substantial nexus to taxing state, reflecting “structural
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy”); Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283, 287-88 (1985) (finding that Privileges and Immunities
Clause prevented New Hampshire from discriminating against nonresidents by denying
those nonresidents the right to practice law there because New Hampshire’s residency rule
lacked “substantial reason” for “difference in treatment” that did not bear substantial or
close relation to state’s given reason for residency requirement); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the
States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110
HARV. L. REV. 377, 431-33 (1996) (explaining that Court’s focal point in its tax jurisprudence
is discriminatory nature of state tax provisions that overly burden out-of-state
competitors); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future — Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 110, 141 (1999) (noting that principles underlying Saenz decision were animated by
concerns for “interstate comity”). The Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
reveals similar centralizing principles. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997) (extending implications of Dormant Commerce
Clause to nonprofit enterprises); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’
Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 123 (2004)
(arguing that Camps Newfound decision suggests that Rehnquist Court was pursuing
“structural federalism jurisprudence” that belied its “reputation as a pro-states’ rights
court”); Weinstein, supra note 168, at 285-86 (explaining that Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence promotes “‘common market’ approach to commerce among states by
invalidating laws that ‘balkanize’ free trade” and thus generating federal restrictions on
state power to promote economic harmony among states).
274
Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (finding that “the freedom to travel
includes the ‘freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union’” (internal citations
omitted)).
275
Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80 (explaining that Privileges and Immunities Clause “was
intended to create a national economic union . . . . [And] therefore [it is] not surprising that
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276

welfare benefits across state lines. In so doing, the Court privileges the
efficient operation of interstate commerce and the integration of the
nation into a single market and polity over individuals’ ties with
particular states.
Notions of state sovereignty over a nonresident’s in-forum activities
accord with the centralizing rhetoric underlying the Court’s judicial
federalism jurisprudence. Upholding a state’s judicial authority over
VoIP communications sent across its borders supports the notion that
state courts are not beset by bias against nonresidents and can fairly hear
all claims before them. The constructive presence theory also honors the
Court’s increasing recognition that individuals enjoy jurisdictionally
significant relationships with many states by acknowledging that
nonresidents’ communications with VoIP subscribers in a variety of fora
can give rise to disputes affecting interests in those states. This approach
recognizes that facilitating the resolution of these disputes in some forum
is important to promoting seamless commerce across state lines.
By contrast, favoring the implied contract theory, as Michiana and
Denver Truck do, undermines the notion of national citizenship. This
misguided approach effectively establishes that states have the exclusive
right to hear claims against their own citizens involving borderless
communications. Forcing an injured party to bear the cost and
inconvenience of traveling to the defendant’s home state to obtain
redress could deter some businesses from entering into interstate
277
commerce.
Only a strong presumption of state courts’
untrustworthiness, which is wholly inconsistent with the values
underlying the Court’s judicial federalism, could justify rolling back the
this Court repeatedly has found that ‘one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to
citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with
the citizens of that State’” (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948))); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (holding that Iowa law regulating
length of trucks driving on its roads impermissibly burdened “interstate flow of goods by
truck” and was therefore unconstitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) (invalidating statute requiring that residents be hired in
preference to nonresidents for positions related to development of state’s oil and gas
resources); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980) (arguing that
Privileges and Immunities Clause was “intended and has been interpreted to mean” that
“whatever entitlements those living in a state see fit to vote themselves will generally be
extended” to out-of-state visitors).
276
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07 (explaining that California’s welfare legislation effectively
deterred welfare applicants from moving to California).
277
At a minimum, it would deter them from obtaining VoIP numbers with out-of-state
area codes, which may be a necessary prerequisite to effective competition in those
markets. This would frustrate the Court’s efforts to prevent state lines from insulating
markets from competitive pressures.
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clock to the nineteenth century rule of Pennoyer. Thus, a proper
recognition of the state sovereignty principle in the minimum contacts
doctrine would acknowledge that states maintain significant ties with
nonresidents who transmit communications to VoIP users in their
borders and that state courts are competent to hear those claims.
C.

Alternative Means for Protecting Nonresidents from a Sovereign State’s
Unreasonable Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

A nonresident’s implied agreement is not essential to ensure that a
state’s exercise of its sovereign judicial authority over nonresidents
comports with due process. The reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its
judicial authority can be determined by assessing the state’s regulatory
278
interest in the nonresident’s territorial conduct. In this analysis, courts
should examine the objective impact of the nonresident’s litigation279
280
raising local activity.
To that end, the inquiry is claim-specific.
When a state has a strong regulatory interest in the nonresident’s inforum activity, the nonresident’s conduct would justify the state’s
exercise of its judicial authority so long as “fair play and substantial
281
justice” supported that result.
A state’s weak interest in the

278
Stein, supra note 124, at 413 (arguing that appropriate jurisdictional inquiry under
minimum contacts doctrine is “not whether a defendant has surrendered his or her liberty,
but whether the state’s assertion of judicial authority sufficiently advances its regulatory
interests to justify the attendant burden that such a proceeding would impose upon
conduct outside of its territory”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405-06 (urging Court to
replace purposefulness inquiry with rule that honors territorial sovereignty of states, such
as examination of defendant’s “liability-raising” conduct in state’s territory that warrants
state regulation); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (sanctioning
extraterritorial jurisdiction only where nonresidents establish meaningful ties to forum);
Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 81-82, 85 (arguing that state adjudicative authority is
reasonable where states have regulatory interest in nonresidents forum activities that
constitute “substantively relevant events”).
279
See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-75 (1985).
280
Stein, supra note 124, at 413. Under Professor Stein’s “regulatory precision”
approach, due process “tests jurisdictional authority in relation to the nature of a
defendant’s activity, and the regulatory claims of all states with an interest in that activity.
It is multilateral, not bilateral. It is claim-specific, not trans-substantive.” Id.
281
Conflict of laws jurisprudence and a state’s laws can guide state courts in assessing a
state’s interest in a particular nonresident’s in-forum, litigation-related activity. Verizon
Online Services v. Ralsky, for example, involved nonresident defendants who sent millions
of harmful spam e-mails to Virginia residents over the Virginia plaintiff’s Internet service.
203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (E.D. Va. 2002). The defendants claimed that the Virginia court
lacked jurisdiction over them since they never knew where they sent the e-mails and thus
never purposefully availed themselves of Virginia’s laws. Id. at 619. The Virginia court
found the defendants’ argument unpersuasive. Id. at 617, 619. The court explained that the
defendants could not escape Virginia’s judicial jurisdiction “by simply pleading ignorance
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nonresident’s local conduct, on the other hand, would suggest that the
282
state’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
Some courts
have moved in this direction in cases involving harmful e-mails sent to
283
forum residents.
Moreover, as the Court’s decisions in the punitive
284
damages arena illustrate, a nonresident’s implied agreement is not

as to where [plaintiff’s] servers were located.” Id. at 620. “To do so would constitute a
manifest injustice to Verizon and Virginia” that would offend Virginia’s sovereign power
to try causes in its courts, and the Due Process Clause does not give defendants a free pass
to commit torts with “impunity.” Id. The court, rather than asking if the defendants
purposefully connected with Virginia, assessed Virginia’s interest in the defendants’ instate activities to determine whether Virginia’s exercise of its judicial authority would be
reasonable under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 617. The court, relying on the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, explained that a “state has an especial interest in exercising
judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory.” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 36.1 (1988)). The court held that Virginia’s
interest in the defendants’ tortious conduct, coupled with the fact that the defendants
intended to send the harmful e-mails that caused significant harm to Virginia residents,
illustrated that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfied the
“contacts” inquiry of the minimum contacts doctrine. Id. at 618. The court separately
addressed whether its exercise of jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and
substantial justice” and found that fairness also supported the court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at 621.
282
See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[A] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is
present within its territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is so attenuated
as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”); Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 617
(“A state’s interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over a tortfeasor takes on a stronger
role than in other contexts such as a contract dispute.”).
283
Courts have refused to allow the purposefulness inquiry to divest states of their
judicial authority over nonresidents who sent harmful e-mails to forum residents. See, e.g.,
Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18; Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 77879 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (finding jurisdiction over defendant in federal district court in
Mississippi in tort case where defendant sent e-mail all over world, including to
Mississippi residents, that falsely suggested plaintiff’s involvement in pornographic
website because it would not be “unfair” to subject defendant to jurisdiction in Mississippi
since defendant sent e-mail solicitation for pecuniary gain “at her own peril” and thus
could not claim that “it was not reasonably foreseeable that she could be haled into a
distant jurisdiction to answer for the ramifications of that solicitation”); Fenn v. MLeads
Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (finding that defendant “should have
anticipated being haled into court wherever its email were received, even in Utah”).
284
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court’s due process
analysis of state punitive damages awards). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell, the Court held that due process “dictate[s] that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the
penalty that a State may impose.” 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003). In assessing whether the
state punitive damages award comported with the Due Process Clause, the Court did not
invoke concepts of implied agreement. Id. Instead, the Court examined the state’s
territorial authority over the defendant’s conduct and the excessive nature of the award in
light of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the difference between the actual
harm inflicted and the award, and the amount of the award compared to awards in similar
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essential to ensuring that a state’s exercise of its sovereign authority
comports with due process.
Although this rule would expand personal jurisdiction to cases not
meeting the purposefulness requirement, other means exist to protect
nonresidents from being haled into distant courts unfairly. Under
existing doctrine, even if a state’s exercise of its judicial authority would
be reasonable given its strong regulatory interest in the nonresident’s inforum conduct, its courts lack personal jurisdiction over that nonresident
where the litigation would overly burden the parties, the court system,
285
and the substantive policies of the several states. In that regard, Asahi
illustrates that the “fair play and substantial justice” concerns provide
meaningful protection for nonresidents defendants.
Aside from the protections offered by current doctrine and this
proposal, concerns about a nonresident’s inconvenience also can be
accommodated at the “subconstitutional level using the doctrine of
286
forum non conveniens.”
The forum non conveniens doctrine, for
example, permits courts to adjust for “potential inequities between the
parties” by facilitating conditional dismissals — “a device not available
287
under the ‘black-or-white’ approach to jurisdiction.”
Some may argue that this proposal contravenes the notion that an
individual’s consent is essential for the legitimacy of a state’s assertion of
288
its judicial authority.
This argument fails for both theoretical and
practical reasons. First, an individual’s consent, as conceived in current
289
personal jurisdiction law, is “hypothetical.”
As Professor Brilmayer
has observed, “theories of tacit consent assume almost exactly what they
290
set out to prove.”
cases. Id. at 419-20.
285
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see supra notes
195, 197, and 200 and accompanying text.
286
Perdue, supra note 124, at 469.
287
Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement
of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 819 (1988).
288
See, e.g., Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L.
REV. 5, 19 (1989); Transgrud, supra note 92, at 884-85.
289
Perdue, supra note 124, at 465.
290
Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304 (1989).
Scholars have long argued, on other grounds, that purposefulness has no place in the law
of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 86, at 734-35 (arguing that exchange
justification in minimum contacts analysis is flawed because “if purposeful availment
implies contractual fairness, whether by actual or constructive contract, it does not work”);
Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405 (arguing that because personal jurisdiction rules concerns
limits on territorial sovereignty, “intent” requirement “disregards territorial sovereignty
model it claims to be applying”). An argument, however, can be made that the Court’s
decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota undermines this Article’s contention that the
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Second, as a practical matter, purposefulness can no longer serve as an
instrument to measure the reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its
judicial authority because its notions of “fair warning” and implied
agreement operate under last century’s assumption that individuals
communicate from known locations. In the twenty-first century where
area codes do not accurately signify geographic locations, the
purposefulness inquiry is obsolete. Indeed, individuals today know
their communications may be transmitted to VoIP or cellular phones and
are thus “fairly warned” that their calls, e-mails, and faxes may be
received in unexpected locations. Individuals, in that sense, can be said
291
to have “assumed the risk” of the jurisdictional consequences of their
remote communications.
In the hypothetical in the prior subpart, A contacted Pennsylvania via
the phone calls and faxes it made to B there. Because the allegedly
misleading remarks that gave rise to B’s fraud claim essentially occurred
in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania likely would have a strong interest in

purposefulness inquiry is not essential to the protection of a nonresident’s due process
guarantees. 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (upholding North Dakota’s jurisdiction to tax
Delaware mail-order company under Due Process Clause because company had
purposefully directed its activities to North Dakota residents). While Quill affirms the
significance of purposefulness in the law of due process, it does not undermine the
argument made here that the purposefulness inquiry jeopardizes state regulatory authority
and unnecessarily protects defendants beyond the guarantees of due process in borderless
communications where defendants lack knowledge of the geographic location of
individuals they contact. Quill is distinguishable because the Court affirmed the
significance of purposefulness to the due process inquiry in a case where the defendant
directed its activity to a known location – catalogues and products sent through the mail to
North Dakota residents. See id. at 302, 308. Thus, in Quill, the “fair warning” of the
purposefulness inquiry was ably satisfied by the defendant’s action of mailing catalogues
and products to North Dakota. There, the defendant knew he reached out to, and made
taxable sales in, North Dakota, much in the same way that the defendant in Burger King
knew that in sending mail to the plaintiff in Florida he risked litigation there. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). But in a world of borderless VoIP
communications where parties do not, and cannot, predict the home fora of their contacts,
the purposefulness requirement leads to anomalous results. For a more in-depth treatment
of Quill, see generally John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation
or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419, 425 (2002) (discussing immunizing effect of Quill
on companies seeking to avoid state taxation and suggesting alternative methods of
establishing physical presence in forum), and compare David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2599 (2005) (exploring how Quill diminishes states’
authority to tax commercial activity within their borders).
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Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who sent millions of spam e-mails
through plaintiff Verizon’s servers because defendants “assumed the risk” of injuring
valuable property in Virgnia, even though defendants claimed to have no knowledge of
destination of their e-mails).
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regulating A’s allegedly fraudulent remarks transmitted to its territory.
The “fair play and substantial justice” considerations would determine if
B’s inconvenience, judicial efficiency, and the state’s interests would
counsel divesting the Pennsylvania court of jurisdiction over B.
This standard would advance the critical concerns of the law of
personal jurisdiction. It would secure a state’s sovereign authority over
harmful communications transmitted to its territory, protect
nonresidents from unreasonable assertions of state judicial authority,
and ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction would not unduly burden the
parties, the courts, and the shared states’ interests.
CONCLUSION
Modern personal jurisdiction law has long rested securely on the twin
pillars of territorial presence and implied contract. This edifice,
however, cannot stand. These concepts will come into irreconcilable
conflict when applied to the borderless communications of the twentyfirst century. The Supreme Court designed the modern minimum
contacts doctrine to expand state adjudicative authority over
nonresidents who knowingly established their presence in a state
through
twentieth-century
transportation
or
communication
technologies. In the traditional telephone system, where area codes let
callers know the states they contacted, the concepts of in-forum presence
and implied contract operate in sync. But since the Court last revisited
personal jurisdiction, communication technologies have made radical
advances. Twenty-first century technologies like VoIP now remove the
geographic marker from all of our communications, including e-mail,
voice, fax, file-sharing, and real-time video conferencing.
Given a defendant’s inability to purposefully direct VoIP calls to
particular fora, the borderless communications of the twenty-first
century cannot fit in the minimum contacts paradigm. This will force the
Court to decide whether constructive presence or implied contract is the
primary operating principle of personal jurisdiction law. Some lower
courts, addressing the jurisdictional import of cellular phone contacts,
have deemed the implied contract theory paramount, finding harmful
communications directed to cellular phone users jurisdictionally
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See generally Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (explaining
that “it is beyond dispute that [a state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that
actually occur within the [s]tate” because “[a] state has an especial interest in exercising
judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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insignificant because such calls cannot be directed to particular places.
This Article has shown the mechanistic short-sightedness of this
approach and its implicit disregard of state sovereignty. Although voice,
fax, and data communications in the twenty-first century will
increasingly lack geographic markers, we nonetheless live in a world of
territorial boundaries where state regulatory powers matter. To avoid
the wholesale elimination of extraterritorial state authority and a cloak of
immunity over all remote communications, the implied contract theory
should not be sustained. Legitimate due process concerns can and
should be addressed without the artifice of an implied contract to protect
defendants from abusive process. This result promotes a healthy
federalism, reconciling some seemingly inconsistent centrifugal and
centripetal themes in this Court’s jurisprudence, and promotes judicial
efficiency.

